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Abstract
Merger review is the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy.  It is now widely believed
that merger policy must move beyond its traditional focus on short-run, price and output 
effects to account for longer-run effects on technological innovation.  The question is,
how should merger policy adapt to technological change? Some have argued that the 
right response is for antitrust authorities to reduce merger enforcement to prevent 
unintended harm to innovation. Others have suggested that the enforcement agencies 
analyze a merger’s effects on innovation using the same framework they use to analyze a 
transaction’s effects on prices and output levels. We argue that merger authorities should 
neither treat innovation like price and output under the existing framework nor retreat
from enforcement in the name of innovation. We examine how merger policy should 
change both to accommodate the influence of innovation on traditional, static efficiency 
concerns and to recognize that innovation can itself be an important dimension of market 
performance affected by a merger.
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1Introduction
Policy makers and economists strongly agree that innovation is a critical component of a 
sustained, healthy economy.  It is no accident that policy makers’ concern with fostering 
innovation grew over the course of the 1980’s and 1990’s, a period during which those industrial 
sectors typically defined as “high technology,” such as aerospace, telecommunications, 
biotechnology, software, and computers, increased their combined share of manufacturing output 
by more than 50 percent.1
At the same time that innovation has become a central focus of economic policy, merger 
enforcement has been the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy.  From 1991 to 2002, the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an average of 161 merger 
investigations each year, which is more than all of the division’s other civil and criminal 
investigations combined.2  Merger investigations constitute a similarly important part of the 
Federal Trade Commission’s “Maintaining Competition Mission.”3
The fact that much of the merger activity in recent years has occurred in the industries 
attracting attention because of their innovation-based growth highlights the question of how well 
traditional merger enforcement accounts for technological change. Merger policy faces a 
perplexing problem in industries marked by ongoing technological innovation; a problem related,
in part, to the uncertain fit between the market conditions that produce innovation and the market
conditions to which antitrust policy aspires and, in part, to uncertainty about how innovation 
might affect market structure and performance. Antitrust law in general is concerned with the 
structure of markets and the behavior of firms within those markets. Merger enforcement in 
particular is concerned with preserving meaningful competition and protecting consumer welfare 
when business enterprises attempt to combine. At the heart of merger policy is antitrust law’s 
1 Economic Report of the President 1999 Washington: United States Government Printing Office, at ____.
2 An average of 131 other investigations were conducted per year (United States Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics 1991-2002).  Non-merger antitrust actions include criminal 
prosecutions of price-fixing cartels, as well as civil actions against individual companies found to have 
engaged in anticompetitive practices (e.g., the Microsoft case).
3 See Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Budget Justification (April 9, 2001), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/2002budgetjustification.pdf, p. 46-60.
2presumption that greater competition in the form of reduced product-market concentration brings
improved market performance and increased consumer benefits in the form of lower prices, 
higher quality, and higher output.  Although this presumption is reasonably well accepted for
consumer welfare effects due to changes in short-term price and output levels, it is much less 
accepted for consumer welfare effects due to changes in innovation, the flow of new products, 
and other longer-term benefits.  In some instances, innovation may be greater when concentration 
is greater.  Hence merger policy’s problem: if antitrust enforcement is to promote and not disrupt 
the benefits of innovation, and if antitrust is properly to account for innovation’s effects on 
market performance over time, to what extent should it adhere to its conventional, competition-
oriented presumptions in markets characterized by technological change?
To the extent there are significant instances in which greater concentration is conducive 
to innovation, innovative industries pose another central problem for antitrust enforcement: there 
can be tradeoffs between static and dynamic objectives.  Consumers benefit from competition 
because, when producers face rivalry, they seek to attract customers through lower prices and 
higher quality. Consumers also benefit from technological innovation because, when firms’ 
invest in research and development (R&D), they can create valuable new products and reduce the 
costs of producing existing products. Product-market competition and innovation are both,
therefore, natural objectives of public policies designed to further consumer welfare.  But 
policies designed to pursue one of these objectives cannot always be implemented without costs 
for the other. The patent system, for example, sometimes confers temporary monopolies on 
inventors to encourage technological progress and sacrifices competition for the sake of 
innovation. Antitrust law, in contrast, generally works against monopoly by restricting 
anticompetitive conduct and preventing consolidations that lead to accumulations of market 
power that undermine competition.
In the light of the potential tension between competition and innovation, and in the light 
of the uncertainty that innovation creates for predictions about competitive effects of mergers and 
future market conditions, a growing body of commentary has questioned the relationship of 
antitrust law to innovation. More specifically, that commentary has criticized enforcement policy 
toward mergers and acquisitions for attempting to preserve short- run price competition even 
3when doing so has adverse effects on technological progress and even where innovation is likely 
to ameliorate a merger’s short-run harms to competition.
Antitrust authorities have themselves shared the critics’ recognition of innovation as an 
important driver of national economic welfare.  Enforcement officials have identified investment 
in research and the diffusion of new technology as being among the most important dimensions 
of market performance.  One former head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division 
observed that “the more important that innovation becomes to society, the more important it is to 
preserve economic incentives to innovate.”4  Another senior antitrust official stated that, “as 
important as price competition is to us, a second major and possibly even greater concern is 
maintaining competition for innovation.”5 These two statements illustrate the recognition that 
innovation has important consequences for merger policy.  But within them also lurks an 
important question: does “maintaining competition for innovation” in fact “preserve economic 
incentives to innovate”?  In other words, does the static efficiency presumption that more 
competition (as measured by the degree of concentration) is generally better carry over to 
dynamic efficiency considerations?6  Thus, although antitrust policy has increasingly focused on 
innovation, what exactly this new focus means or how it translates into enforcement can be 
difficult to ascertain.
Given criticism of conventional enforcement and recognition of the importance of 
innovation, two fundamental questions have arisen about the appropriate response of merger 
policy.  Should merger enforcement take innovation considerations into account?  And, if so,
how? There is little consensus among scholars, policy makers, or practitioners about the answers 
to these questions or about the appropriate degree of governmental intervention in markets with 
significant actual or potential innovation.  
4 Statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice before 
the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
March 22, 2000. p.6. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/4381.pdf. 
5
“Antitrust Considerations in International Defense Mergers,” address by Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II 
Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice (May 4, 1999), p. 3.
6 Of course even static efficiency may be higher with less competition if there are economies of scale and 
“competition” is equated with the number of suppliers.
4Concern for the potential adverse effects of mergers on R&D has motivated some 
scholars and policy makers to argue that merger enforcement must be active in markets 
characterized by high levels of actual or potential innovation.  They assert that the existing 
framework for merger analysis can be applied to dynamic markets or, alternatively, that 
incorporating innovation into merger review can be accomplished by modifying the standard 
approach to merger analysis.  One such proposed modification is to define “innovation 
markets”—markets that encompass the actual and potential competitors in the research and 
development for a future product—and to apply merger law to those markets in much the same 
way that merger law is conventionally applied to markets for beer, bicycles, computer chips, or 
any tangible good or service. 
An opposing set of observers argues that, as a practical matter, “innovation markets” are 
so difficult to define that they cannot be the basis for rational enforcement decisions. More 
fundamentally, some of these opposing observers also argue that innovation provides a rationale 
for a more permissive merger policy.  One argument advanced in support of this line of reasoning
appeals to what is known as “Schumpeterian competition,” in which temporary monopolists 
successively displace one another through innovation.7  Under Schumpeterian competition, there 
may be little head-to-head price competition between the product market’s leading supplier and 
its rivals at any given time, but there is ongoing innovation competition over time that challenges 
the leading supplier to stay ahead of its competitors or lose its market position.  Proponents of 
permissive merger policy contend that mergers in such markets can do only limited harm because 
of the constant competitive threat from new technologies and that merger may in fact help to 
speed innovation by bringing complementary assets together. They argue that, in innovation-
based industries, merger enforcement promises little benefit but risks the unintended effect of 
slowing innovation by blocking mergers that would bring together complementary assets in a 
way that would foster innovation.
7 Schumpeterian competition is named after Joseph Schumpeter, who asserted that it is a central feature of the 
modern economy.  Joseph A Schumpeter (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracracy, New York: 
Harper & Row, Chapters 7-8.  For a discussion of antitrust policy toward single-firm conduct in markets 
characterized by Schumpeterian competition, see Evans, David S., and Richard Schmalensee (2002) “Some 
Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries,” in Innovation Policy and 
the Economy, Vol. 2, Jaffee, Lerner, and Stern (ed.s), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
5Even those who favor the use of innovation markets by merger authorities divide over 
whether, once such markets are defined, the anti-concentration presumptions of merger law 
should apply to them or should instead be withdrawn in favor of a neutral, fact-intensive inquiry 
into whether the merger will hinder innovation.  And those who reject the innovation market idea 
divide over whether merger enforcement should continue along conventional lines or, in keeping 
with the “Schumpeterian” idea, systematically retreat in the face of uncertainty over the effects of 
merger enforcement on technological innovation.
These debates have yielded substantial sentiment in favor of systematic retreat from 
conventional enforcement guidelines and presumptions.8  They have produced less, but not 
insignificant, support for incorporating innovation into the conventional framework through the 
analysis of innovation markets; and some, but even less, argument in favor of maintaining merger 
enforcement’s narrow focus on short-run price competition or at least applying the same 
competitive presumptions to innovation that apply to static price and output measures.
In this paper, we offer our own answers to the questions of whether and how merger 
enforcement should take innovation into account. Our answer to the question of whether merger 
policy should take innovation into account is “yes.” Our answer the question of how it should do 
so is to propose several changes to the presumptions and analytical framework of the current 
merger enforcement process. We argue that merger enforcement should neither systematically 
retreat from markets characterized by significant innovation nor assume that innovation 
competition can be appropriately treated in a manner wholly parallel to price competition.  
Instead, our analysis suggests that merger policy should strengthen its current framework by 
implementing a better understanding of the relationships between competition and innovation. 
We propose several specific ways to strengthen merger review, and we also discuss how merger 
policy can develop a more sophisticated approach for incorporating uncertainty about future 
economic events into enforcement decisions.
We begin in Section I with a discussion of the conventional approach to merger review.
In Section II, we discuss the challenges that innovation poses for the conventional analysis and 
examine the policy debate that has arisen in response to those challenges. In Section III, we 
8 Ronald W. Davis, “Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective,” 71 
Antitrust L.J. 677 (2003) at ___.
6examine how antitrust law’s underlying presumption that consumer welfare increases with 
competition applies where consumer welfare may be affected by technological innovation. In 
Sections IV through VII, we examine the likelihood that the established framework for merger 
enforcement can successfully address the inter-relationship between market structure and 
innovation and what changes would be necessary to improve merger review in technologically 
dynamic settings.  Throughout Sections IV through VII, we develop a series of findings and 
recommendations about how merger policy can better accommodate innovation considerations. 
Those successive sections work through the major steps and assumptions of the established 
merger-review framework and identify the challenges innovation presents for them.  To illustrate 
how these challenges are met in practice, in Section VIII we discuss and evaluate merger cases in 
which the antitrust agencies have focused on innovation. We conclude in Section IX with a set 
of policy recommendations. We then apply those recommendations to a recent merger case to 
illustrate how our proposed approach would affect enforcement in practice.
I. Conventional Merger Review
As groundwork for understanding the implications of innovation for the application of 
merger policy, we first present a brief survey of the current U.S. merger-review process.9 The 
vast majority of mergers challenged by the U.S. antitrust agencies—the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice (Justice Department) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—are 
challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The Act makes it illegal for one company to 
acquire some or all of the assets of a competitor where the effects “may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”10 The statute reflects the fundamental premise of 
merger policy, and of antitrust policy in general, that increased competition results in improved 
9 Although our focus is on the United States, it is worth observing that the European Commission and many 
other competition policy agencies in other regions and nations have modeled their merger-review processes 
in whole or in part on the U.S. approach.
10 15 U.S.C. Section 18.  Mergers can also be challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Section 1, which bars “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”
In addition, private challenges can be made against mergers (although they face antitrust-injury and 
standing hurdles), which may be motivated by very different considerations than governmental challenges.   
Our focus here is on public policy.
7economic performance.11  Specifically, antitrust policy is grounded on the belief that competitive 
markets generally do the best job of producing and delivering at the lowest feasible prices the 
goods and services consumers want, and the statutes are typically interpreted as imposing a 
consumer-welfare standard.
Economists generally favor some notion of economy-wide efficiency over a consumer-
welfare standard.12  Although some antitrust commentators write as if the pursuit of overall 
economic efficiency and the maximization of consumer welfare are identical objectives, they are 
not.13  The critical difference is that economy-wide efficiency involves accounting for the effects 
of actions on the welfare of both producers and consumers, while a consumer-welfare standard 
considers only the latter.14
Under the consumer-welfare standard, agencies challenge mergers they think likely to 
increase the ability of the merged parties to control prices and output of given goods and 
services. The courts use a largely standardized process to evaluate mergers when the agencies 
bring such legal challenges.15  In brief, merger analysis forms a prediction of a proposed 
transaction’s effects on consumer welfare by examining present characteristics of the parties to 
the transaction and the market setting in which those parties operate.  The agencies’ review 
focuses on how the merging parties’ combination will affect market concentration, which is 
11 See, e.g., Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/9142.pdf (2001), Sections 1, 2, 4; Antitrust Guidelines for 
Collaborations Among Competitors on the FTC web site (04/2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf, p. 1, 4, 6. 
12 This is a matter of judgment, rather than economic theory.  Moreover, the theoretical and empirical tools of 
economics are extremely valuable in assessing mergers under a consumer-welfare standard.
13 See, e.g., Neven, Damien J., and Lars-Hendrik Roller (2000) “Institution Design: The Allocation of 
jurisdiction in international antitrust,” European Economic Review 44: 845-855.
14 It should be observed, however, that application of the consumer surplus standard in antitrust policy is 
tempered by the fact that consumer harm is of concern to antitrust policy only if it arises from harm to 
competition.  Thus, it is not illegal for a monopolist to charge “high” prices if that monopoly has been 
legitimately obtained.  And antitrust policy does not seek drive prices below their competitive level even if 
doing so might increase consumer surplus (at least in the short run).
15 See, e.g., Baker, Jonathan B. (2003) “Responding to developments in economics and the courts: Entry in 
the merger guidelines,” Antitrust Law Journal 71:189-206, and Scheffman, David, Malcolm Coate, and 
Louis Silvia (2003) “Twenty years of merger guidelines enforcement at the FTC: An economic 
perspective,” Antitrust Law Journal 71: 277-318.
8taken as a key indicator of competitive effects, and whether there are offsetting benefits, known 
as efficiencies.16
The federal antitrust agencies have issued a set of Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Merger 
Guidelines) that purport to provide a blueprint for how the agencies will conduct their analysis of 
a merger.17  These guidelines provide a specific market-definition methodology as well as 
benchmarks for the assessment of concentration.18  The Merger Guidelines do not have the force 
of law and, indeed, the Merger Guidelines explicitly (and accurately) state that the agencies may 
pursue different lines of argument in litigation.19  Nonetheless, the broad contours of the Merger 
Guidelines process have been widely adopted by the agencies and the courts. That process can 
be summarized as consisting of four main steps.
1. Market Definition and Market Share Determination. Antitrust policy is premised on a 
general presumption that an increase in concentration will harm consumer welfare. In order to 
determine the effects of a merger on market concentration, it is necessary to define one or more 
relevant markets.20  Defining market boundaries with respect to their product and geographic 
scopes is thus a first step under the Merger Guidelines and is also typically an early issue in any 
merger litigation.21   Indeed, given the weight that the courts attach to market concentration 
measures and the extent to which these measures depend on how market boundaries are drawn, it 
is often said that the outcome of merger litigation turns almost entirely on whether the market is 
defined narrowly or broadly and, thus, on whether the merging parties are viewed as having few 
or many competitors.22
16 See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n. 12 (11th Cir.1991); FTC v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1986); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1081-82 (D.D.C.1997).
17 United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
rev. April 8, 1997 (hereafter, Merger Guidelines).
18 It is questionable whether the agencies actually use the benchmarks stated in the Merger Guidelines.
19 Merger Guidelines, Section 0.1.
20 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
21 See, e.g., Merger Guidelines, Section 1; Toys R Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
22 See, e.g., Parker, Richard G. (1998) “Trends in Merger Enforcement and Litigation, § 2,” available at:
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/parker.htm>.
9An increase in concentration in the relevant product and geographic markets is taken as a 
proxy for a decrease in competition that—if large enough—will lead to a significant increase in 
the prices faced by consumers.23  In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, for example, 
the Supreme Court defined the relevant product as a cluster of services that constitute 
commercial banking and defined the relevant geographical market as the four-county area in 
which the merging parties had offices.24   The Court held that a merger between the region’s first 
and second largest banks, which would have given the merged entity a 35 percent market share 
measured in terms of assets, created impermissible concentration and had to be enjoined.25
Modern merger policy does not contain a rigid market share threshold such as that 
suggested by the Court in Philadelphia National Bank. Instead, merger analysis today begins 
with a set of presumptions established in the Guidelines, and these presumptions are based on a 
measure of market structure that is more nuanced than simply adding the market shares of the 
merging parties.  The Guidelines adopt the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which one
calculates by taking the individual market share of each firm in the market, squaring it, and then 
adding all the squared figures together to get a single index number. This “sum of the squares of 
the market shares” figure communicates two important things that a single firm’s market share or 
a four-firm concentration ratio (another measure used in the past) does not: a picture of 
concentration for the entire relevant market, and a measure of the distribution of market shares 
across all firms in the market. The HHI is higher where market share is unevenly distributed 
across firms than if it is evenly distributed, thus capturing the idea that a market with five evenly 
sized firms may be more vigorously competitive than a market with one very big firm and several 
smaller ones. Consider, for example, two alternative market structures, the first with five evenly 
sized firms and the second with one firm that has 60 percent of the market and four firms with 10 
23 For the most part, economic theory and antitrust policy have long favored more competitors over fewer for 
the purpose of lowering prices, expanding output, and making consumers better off.  There are, however, 
limited exceptions to this view.  For example, certain industries in which per-unit cost declines as output 
increases to the point that it is most efficient to have just one firm producing all output in a given market 
have come to be known as natural monopolies.   Historically, telecommunications networks were a leading 
example, and public policy actually served to limit entry.  That view has since changed.  For instance, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq, seeks to promote competitive entry. 
24 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
25 Ibid.
10
percent each. The HHI for the first market would be 2000. The HHI for the second market would 
be 3000. Each market has the same number of competitors, but the higher HHI number for the 
second market reflects the market power that a firm with a 60 percent share may be able to 
exercise.
Depending on the level of HHI, the antitrust agencies adopt different presumptions about 
the impact of the proposed merger. Under the Guidelines, if the post- merger HHI would be 
below 1000, the agencies consider the market to be unconcentrated and generally view the 
merger as unlikely to have adverse effects on competition. If the post-merger HHI is between 
1000 and 1800, the agencies label the market moderately concentrated and become concerned 
only if the merger would raise the HHI more than 100 points within that range. Post-merger 
HHIs above 1800 are the most likely to trigger an enforcement action under the Guidelines. Such 
markets are deemed highly concentrated and mergers that have the effect of raising the HHI more 
than 50 points in the range above 1800 raise concerns, while those proposed transactions that 
would raise the HHI more than 100 points are presumed to be anticompetitive.
In actual practice, the U.S. antitrust agencies tend to challenge mergers only at 
concentration levels much higher than 1800. One recent study found that few mergers have been 
challenged with an HHI below 2000 and that, between 1999 and 2003, the median post-merger 
HHI for a challenged transaction was 4500, with a median change in HHI of about 1200.26  One 
reason for the discrepancy between the Guidelines’ levels and actual enforcement is due to the 
fact that the HHI calculation supplies only a presumption of harm; a presumption that must be 
followed by assessment of market factors other than concentration that determine a merger’s 
competitive effects.
2. Competitive Effects Analysis. The typical next step in the antitrust analysis of a 
proposed merger is to go beyond presumptions to predict its effects on competition.  This more 
intensive analysis of competitive effects generally focuses on two kinds of impacts a merger 
might have: “unilateral” effects and “coordinated” effects. The Merger Guidelines define 
unilateral effects as those that result “because merging firms may find it profitable to alter their 
26 John Kwoka, “Some Thoughts on Concentration, Market Shares, and Merger Enforcement Policy,” 
presented at the FTC/DOJ Workshop on Merger Enforcement, Washington, D.C., February 17, 2004 
(available at http://www. ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217kwoka.pdf).
11
behavior unilaterally following the acquisition by elevating price and suppressing output.”27 The 
ability a merger creates for the combined firm profitably to raise prices or cut output without the 
necessity of cooperation from rival suppliers is thus what gives rise to unilateral effects.
Coordinated effects, in contrast, are “comprised of actions by a group of firms that are profitable 
for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others.”28 The increased 
risk a merger creates for collusive behavior among would-be competitors is what gives rise to 
coordinated effects.
Although the distinction between unilateral and coordinated effects is widely made, it is 
valuable to recognize that this distinction is not as sharp as often supposed.  For example, it blurs 
when one considers “conscious parallelism” or tacit collusion, which as an economic matter 
looks like coordinated behavior but in which each firm acts unilaterally and in its own economic 
interests. Another possible way to think about the respective unilateral-effects and coordinated-
effects inquiries is to say that the first asks whether the post-merger entity will have gained 
power profitably to set price and output regardless of what its rivals would do in response (within 
the bounds of supplier rationality) and the second asks whether a merger will increase the risk
that firms in the market will act in concert to harm competition.
3. Efficiencies Analysis.  If the analysis of market shares and other market characteristics 
demonstrates that a proposed merger will not give rise to a significant competitive problem, one 
can conclude that the merger will not harm competition and consumers.  But if a significant 
competitive problem is predicted by the preceding stages of analysis, then one must examine 
efficiencies and conduct another stage of review to predict correctly whether a proposed merger 
will, on balance, benefit or harm consumers.  Simply put, a merger that is expected to give the 
merging parties the ability to raise prices profitably might nonetheless lead to lower prices or at 
least to greater social welfare if the merger gives rise to sufficient cost savings of the right sort.  
These cost savings are referred to as efficiencies.29
27 Merger Guidelines at __.  A recent example of a unilateral effects case is U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 18063 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2004).
28 Merger Guidelines at __.  A recent example of a coordinated effects case is FTC v. Arch Coal Inc., 2004 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 15996 (D.D.C., Aug. 16, 2004).
29 The Merger Guidelines describe the process as follows:
12
We observe in passing that the agencies give the majority of mergers the benefit of the 
doubt when it comes to efficiencies.  That is, the agencies tend not to challenge mergers unless 
they predict anticompetitive effects above some threshold level.  This approach can be 
rationalized by the implicit assumption that any merger tends to generate some efficiencies,
perhaps by combining complementary assets, by rationalizing operations, or by allowing the 
market for corporate control to discipline poor managers. But we also observe that, in cases 
where agencies predict a merger will give rise to significant adverse competitive effects, the 
courts rarely, if ever, allow the merger on the grounds of offsetting efficiencies. Efficiencies thus 
become a factor mostly when a merger might cause modest competitive harm and where the case 
is close.
4. Remedy Design.  Several public policy responses are available if analysis indicates that 
the effect of a merger in its proposed form may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend 
to create a monopoly.  One, of course, is simply to block the transaction.  Often, however, less 
drastic steps are available that can allow a modified version of the transaction to take place.  
These steps include the divestiture of assets where competitive overlaps are particularly 
significant, the mandatory licensing of intellectual property to other firms to allow them to 
compete more effectively with the merging parties, and limitations on the merged firm’s conduct 
(e.g., a requirement to offer the same prices to all customers to prevent the merged firm from 
targeting customers whose only practical options were the two merging suppliers).  In theory, 
such remedies allow the realization of efficiencies while averting the harms that might otherwise 
arise from the loss of competition—either static price competition or dynamic innovation 
competition—between the two merging suppliers.
As this brief description illustrates, the conventional approach to merger review is 
“static” nature. By “static” we mean it takes a short- term perspective focused on products and 
markets as they exist at the time of (or within a limited time frame after) a proposed merger and 
“The Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and 
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.  To 
make the requisite determination, the Agency considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely 
would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, 
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”  [Section 4, internal footnote omitted.]
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predicts the likely, short-run impact on prices and outputs of those goods as the level of 
competition changes with the merger. Dynamic considerations, such as R&D, although not 
altogether absent, play relative little role.30 This lack of a dynamic approach may cause merger 
review to miss forms of competition that are not reflected in the structure of current product 
markets and to miss effects on consumers other than those reflected in short-run price and output 
levels. 
II. How Innovation Complicates Merger Enforcement
The conventional paradigm and the issues for merger review change substantially in two broad 
ways when technological innovation is taken into account. The first way is that innovation can 
dramatically affect the relationship between the pre-merger marketplace and what is likely to 
happen if the proposed merger is consummated.   That is, technological change can 
fundamentally alter the nature of the appropriate analysis even if one focuses on traditional, 
product-market performance measures, such as static pricing efficiency.  For example, market 
shares are often used as an indicator of market power.  But in theory at least, significant 
innovation may lead to the rapid displacement of a supplier that, by traditional measures such as 
current market share, appears to be dominant.  We will refer to this effect of innovation on 
merger analysis as the “innovation impact” effect.
The second way in which innovation can fundamentally affect merger policy is that 
innovation can itself be an important dimension of market performance that is potentially 
affected by a merger.  That is, through its effects on innovation, a merger can generate 
considerable efficiency and consumer-welfare effects even apart from any direct effects on short-
run product-market competition.  Merging parties frequently assert that their transaction will 
allow them to engage in greater innovation, while antitrust enforcers may object to a transaction 
30 Innovation considerations were raised in some early non-merger cases.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Amer., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) recognized the effects of market power on innovation, although 
innovation concerns did not play a significant role in the decision.  Innovation played a more central role in 
United States v. Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1969), in which the 
court found that the leading American automobile manufacturers had engaged in a conspiracy "to eliminate 
competition in the research, development, manufacture and installation of motor vehicle air pollution 
control equipment  .  .  . " in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in 
part, 397 U.S. 248 [1970]).
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on the grounds that it will lead to a loss of competition that would otherwise spur innovation.  To 
assess fully the impact of a merger on market performance, merger authorities and courts must 
examine how a proposed transaction changes market participants’ incentives and abilities to 
undertake investments in innovation. We will refer to this effect of innovation on merger policy 
as the “innovation incentives” effect.
To examine the innovation incentives effect, one asks how the change in market structure 
and competition brought about by a merger will likely affect consumer welfare through effects on 
the pace or nature of innovation that might reduce costs or bring new products to market.  To 
examine the innovation impact effect, the situation is reversed.  It refers not to how market 
structure will affect innovation but to how innovation will affect the evolution of market 
structure and competition.  Innovation is a force that could make static measures of market 
structure unreliable or irrelevant, and the effects of innovation may be highly relevant to whether 
a merger should be challenged and to the kind of remedy antitrust authorities choose to adopt.
The two ways that innovation may factor into merger analysis have important policy 
implications.  To the extent that innovation is itself a significant objective, antitrust agencies 
need to understand the relationship between market structure and innovation in a given case with 
sufficient depth to distinguish legitimate from merely opportunistic claims that the merger will 
benefit, or at least not harm, innovation incentives.  Similarly, the fact that innovation may affect 
the post-merger marketplace in ways that are hard to predict challenges merger authorities to 
distinguish mere claims by the merging parties that they face potential, innovation-based
competition from situations in which such potential entry really exists.
Finally, the importance of innovation incentives raises the question of whether the
enforcement guidelines and precedent aimed at promoting conventional competitive goals of low 
prices and high output are consistent with promoting the goal of efficient innovation.31  To the 
extent that tension exists between innovation and the static economic goals of merger policy, 
merger enforcement must develop a framework for deciding how to make trade-offs between 
those objectives.
31 Of course, from a long-run perspective, promoting innovation and promoting low, quality-adjusted prices 
are largely the same objective.  The distinction we draw in the text can be viewed as one between static 
pricing efficiency and dynamic pricing efficiency.
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In the following sections we identify particular challenges—either entirely new issues or 
especially strong instances of issues that arise more broadly—created by the presence of 
significant innovation.  We address both the innovation impact effect and the innovation 
incentive effect.  Before addressing how innovation relates to each step of conventional merger 
analysis, however, we examine a critical, underlying question: does antitrust law’s basic premise 
that consumer welfare increases with competition apply when innovation rather than short-run 
price level is the important measure of market performance?  If that presumption changes in the 
context of technological innovation, so too do the importance and method of defining markets, 
analyzing likely competitive effects of a transaction, and other aspects of the merger review 
framework that the Guidelines have created. 
III. The Concentration-Competition-Welfare Presumption
As summarized above, in conventional merger review enforcement officials take an increase in 
concentration in the relevant markets as a proxy for a decrease in competition that—if large 
enough—will lead to a significant increase in the prices faced by consumers.32  Broken down 
somewhat more finely, the courts presume that higher concentration leads to less competition and 
that less competition leads to lower levels of consumer welfare and efficiency; a chain of 
reasoning sometimes referred to as the “concentration-competition-welfare presumption.”
Absent a presumption that changes in concentration lead to changes in consumer welfare, 
the traditional rationale for market definition and approaches that depend on it weakens.  And, as 
we will now discuss, there are difficult issues concerning such a presumption in the context of 
technological innovation.  The discussion of this section is important both for understanding 
what role market definition should play in the incorporation of innovation considerations into 
merger policy and for knowing what, if any, presumptions the enforcement agencies should apply 
to the relationship between mergers and innovation.
32 For the most part, economic theory and antitrust policy have long favored more competition over less for 
the purpose of lowering prices, expanding output, and making consumers better off.  There are, however, 
limited exceptions to this view.  For example, certain industries in which per-unit cost declines as output 
increases to the point that it is most efficient to have just one firm producing all output in a given market 
have come to be known as natural monopolies.   Historically, telecommunications networks were a leading 
example, and public policy actually served to limit entry.  That view has since changed.  For instance, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq, seeks to promote competitive entry. 
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A. The Effects of Innovation on the Traditional Concentration-Competition-
Welfare Presumption
Although subject to some well-placed criticism, the concentration-competition-welfare 
presumption is on fairly sound footing for traditional, static, price and output concerns, whether 
one is talking about current markets or is looking ahead at the relationship between future 
competition and future welfare as measured by price and output.  However, the linkage between 
current concentration and future competition and welfare may be weak in some circumstances, 
notably when there is significant ongoing innovation.  This is so because innovation may be 
unrelated to the concentration of current sales, may make future market structures hard to predict, 
or may alter products in ways that create consumer benefits that offset any harmful changes to 
price and output over time.  In other words, in markets in which innovation is significant, the
traditional concentration-competition relationship is on a weaker or more nuanced empirical and 
theoretical footing than otherwise.
Consider first the traditional presumption concerning short-run price or output 
competition.  Legally, a rebuttable presumption exists that a high resulting level of concentration 
indicates a competitive problem with a proposed merger.33  No general theorem of economics 
proves that higher concentration leads to higher prices or lower output.  However, absent 
innovation, one can expect this relationship for several reasons.  First, many (but not all) formal 
economic models of markets likely to attract merger scrutiny (i.e., those markets in which only a 
few firms compete) indicate that equilibrium output falls and equilibrium prices rise as the 
number of firms declines.  This situation is especially true in markets in which suppliers cannot 
quickly and easily adjust their output levels as they vie to take the market share of the exiting 
firm, or where firms supply differentiated products and product repositioning is difficult.  
Empirically, substantial evidence supports the theoretical correlation of prices and market 
concentration.34  And the presumption that increased competition leads to increased consumer 
33 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
In addition, the Department of Justice and the FTC often take increases in concentration as a reason to be 
concerned about a merger when deciding whether to pursue an enforcement action.  See Merger Guidelines, 
Section 1.5.
34 See, e.g., Schmalensee, Richard (1989) “Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance,” in Handbook 
of Industrial Organization, Vol. II, Schmalensee and Willig (ed.s), Amsterdam: North Holland. 
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welfare or greater efficiency is also generally on sound footing.35  Consumers in the U.S. have 
experienced the benefits of reduced concentration and increased competition in markets such as 
long-distance and wireless telephone services, air travel, and pharmaceuticals.
Although the presumption is on generally firm footing, there is also need for caution.  In 
other models and under specified conditions, increased concentration may not lead to higher 
quality-adjusted prices and entry may not lead to lower quality-adjusted prices.  To generate 
sensible predictions of the effects of a merger, the measurement and analysis of market shares 
should be tied to a coherent theory of competitive effects that fits the facts of the industry under 
consideration.36  Put another way, the analysis of market shares can most confidently be used to 
predict adverse competitive effects of a merger when one has an empirically supported theory 
that market shares are informative of competitive conditions and that an increase in concentration 
will harm competition and consumers.
Another reason that, even absent significant innovation, market share data should be 
interpreted with caution is that merger enforcement is forward looking; the agencies predict the 
likely effects of a transaction.  Conventional market share measures, however, are backward-
looking. This is one important reason why high market share is not, in itself, sufficient to 
establish market power.  Most market share measures reflect where firms were in terms of 
market position (e.g., shares of installed base), or where they are (e.g., shares of sales to 
customers who are new to the industry), but not necessarily where they are going.37
Innovation complicates the interpretation of market share data because this potential 
shortcoming is particularly critical in industries characterized by ongoing innovation and 
technological change.  Innovation may render market shares unstable and hard to predict.  
Indeed, innovation raises the fundamental question of whether current product-market shares are 
meaningful predictors of future competitive conditions in a dynamic industry and thus are 
35 There are some exceptions.  Even in static settings, for instance, perfect competition does not attain the first 
best in the presence of externalities, and distortions due to concentration may in some cases offset those due 
to externalities.
36 Under the process described by the Merger Guidelines, “Market shares will be calculated using the best 
indicator of firms’ future competitive significance.”  Merger Guidelines, Section 1.41. 
37 Of course, in some circumstances, firms current positions are good predictors of their future positions and 
past positions can shed light on the extent of installed-base or related advantages.
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relevant to the prediction of the price and output effects of a merger.  If a market is in constant 
turmoil because of dramatic innovation, the argument goes, what does one learn from current 
product sales?  If the merged firms would have a dominant market share immediately post-
merger, another firm in the market could produce the next great new advance and leave the 
merged entity behind.38 Even in the conventional static setting, a strong consensus exists among 
economists that rival suppliers’ capacity to enter and expand in a market must be considered in 
addition to current market share data. Market shares may be altogether irrelevant in some cases 
because there may be markets in which innovation is so characteristic and sustained that firms 
compete not just for increments of market share but for markets as a whole. The Merger 
Guidelines accordingly recognize that, in changing markets, current market share may be an 
inaccurate measure of a firm’s forward-looking competitive significance.39  In sum, a firm's 
monopoly today may say little about the firm's prospects one, two, or five years from now, and 
the greater the level and rate of innovation in an industry, the less reliable a predictor of future 
events market share becomes.
Similar issues arise with respect to the assessment of potential competition.  In assessing 
concentration, the conventional focus is on actual rather than potential competitors, the latter of 
which are included in the market only when certain conditions of imminence and probability are 
met.  But when innovation is important, identifying potential innovation and product -market 
competitors may be particularly critical to understanding competition and the welfare effects of 
transactions.  Identifying potential competitors can be difficult in the best of situations and 
competitive potentiality in the innovation context often hinges on the possession of certain skills 
and information assets that can be particularly hard to identify and measure. In the other 
direction, however, the existence of ongoing innovation efforts can render claims of potential 
product-market competition more readily verifiable because a firm that has made substantial 
38 The flip side is that a merger may have substantial effects on competition even if the post-merger product-
market share is permissible within the enforcement guidelines.  If the merger brings together two imminent 
technologies that otherwise would have competed, then consumers lose out on rivalry that otherwise would 
have come to exist absent the merger. 
39 Merger Guidelines, Section 1.521.  The extent to which the agencies are willing to adopt forward-looking 
views of competition is the subject of some debate.
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investments in R&D aimed at a specific product is more likely to enter the market for that 
product than is a firm that has the relevant technological capabilities but has invested nothing.
The above discussion shows that it is imperative that merger enforcement agencies look 
beyond current market share data in markets characterized by innovation. More fundamentally, 
though, market-share data are relevant in conventional merger review only because of the 
concentration-competition-welfare presumption.  The arguments above show that in the best of 
circumstances that presumption needs to be applied with caution, especially so in cases where 
innovation is an issue.  There is also a deeper question; one that lies at the heart of the 
“Schumpeterian” critique discussed above: is the concentration-competition-welfare presumption 
valid when one is talking about the dynamic effects of, and on, innovation.  It is to that question 
we now turn.
B. The Concentration-Competition-Welfare Presumption for Innovation
Is concentration a reliable basis for predicting the strength of innovation competition?  Even if 
the market in which innovation takes place can be well defined, the question arises of how 
changes in market structure will affect the performance of that market.  The use of market-share 
data to predict a merger’s likely effects on innovation raises two fundamental issues.  The first is 
how to measure concentration.  Should one consider concentration of product sales or 
concentration of R&D capabilities?  Firms conduct R&D with an eye toward the future.  Thus, 
one can raise serious doubts about the value of current product-market sales as indices of the 
state of innovation-based competition.40  Concentration of R&D capabilities may thus provide a 
better measure.  The second issue is how to treat potential competition.  The threat of entry or 
potential competition may be a stronger spur to innovation efforts than to lowering current prices 
40 See, e.g., Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy Schwartz (1972) “Timing of Innovations under Rivalry.” 
Econometrica 40: 43-60, at 20, (“concentration reflects the current sellers of a product and may be quite 
unrelated to the extent of actual and potential rivalry in innovating new products”.)  See also, Evans and 
Schmalensee (2002, supra note ___, at 16-18) and Hartman, Teece, Mitchell, and Jorde (1993, supra note 
85, at 322-3).  However, current concentration can be related to innovation in some circumstances.  In the 
case of process innovations that are used solely by the innovators in their own production, for example, 
firms with higher market shares have greater innovation incentives.
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and increasing current output.41  Indeed, even R&D programs that never succeed in developing 
new products or processes may nonetheless benefit consumers by stimulating potential rivals to 
innovate.
Although the above considerations are important, they are similar to those just discussed 
in the context of market definition.42  A deeper issue is that, even if appropriate market share 
measures are found and the transaction truly would increase market concentration in a sustained 
way, that concentration may affect innovation incentives differently from how it affects static 
economic variables like price and output. The idea that concentration will not harm and in fact 
may help innovation is central to the Schumpeterians’ claims that merger enforcement should 
tread cautiously in the name of innovation. The discussion that follows examines the relevant 
economic evidence and its implications.
1. The Concentration-R&D Relationship
A central tenet of merger policy is that markets characterized by atomistic competition generally 
promote consumer welfare better than do concentrated markets.  The presumption that increased 
benefits come from an increased number of competitors is weaker, however, when the policy 
goal is not just lowering prices toward more efficient levels for a given set of goods produced 
using a fixed set of technologies but also promoting efficient innovative activity by firms over 
time.  Economic theory has long raised questions about the degree to which increased product-
market competition or an increase in the number of firms undertaking R&D leads to an increase 
41 Under the theory of limit pricing, incumbent firms set low prices today to deter future entry.  In many 
circumstances, however, the threat entry will have little effect on pre-entry prices, and potential competition 
plays a relatively small role in price setting.  This relationship holds when: (a) pre-entry prices do not signal 
otherwise-unknown information about incumbents to potential entrants, and (b) incumbent suppliers can 
rapidly change their prices in response to entry if and when it occurs.  (For additional discussion of limit 
pricing, see Section V below.)  In contrast, shifting R&D programs may be a slow process that takes time to 
bear fruit.  Hence, incumbents may increase their R&D investments in anticipation of entry.
42 We also return to the issue of potential competition in Section V below.
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in overall R&D investment.43  Both the theoretical and empirical bases for predicting that an 
increase in concentration will lead to less innovation are mixed.
The idea that the economic conditions that maximize innovation over time may not be the 
same conditions that allocate resources efficiently in the short run was suggested over fifty years 
ago by Joseph Schumpeter, who wrote that, for purposes of promoting economic welfare, 
“perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up as the 
model of ideal efficiency.”44  Schumpeter’s argument that most technological innovation would 
come from large corporations with market power and organized R&D operations implied that the 
ideal of competition under antitrust law could have substantial social costs over time.45
Although Schumpeter wrote mostly about large firms, their associated economies of scale 
for R&D, and their ability to attract capital and talented scientists, his critique of perfect 
competition and discussion of the benefits of market power suggest that his ideal innovators were 
not only large but dominant as well.  Early theoretical explorations of Schumpeter’s claim found 
that when the polar cases of monopoly and perfect competition were compared, the latter 
provided stronger incentives for cost-reducing innovations.46  Subsequent theoretical research has 
shown that, depending on various conditions, either monopoly power or competition may lead to 
43
 For example, in their 1975 survey of work on innovation and market structure, Kamien and Schwartz stated 
that “Few, if any, economists maintain that perfect competition efficiently allocates resources for technical 
advance.” (Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy L. Schwartz (1975) “Market Structure and Innovation: A 
Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature, XIII: 1–37, at 2.)  Today, economists have a deeper appreciation 
for licensing and other forms of innovation diffusion, so there might be less agreement with such a sweeping 
statement because multiple interpretations of what is meant by perfect competition are possible in this 
context.
44 Schumpeter, supra note ___, at 106.
45 Of course, the competitive ideal of antitrust policy has evolved over time.  When Schumpeter was writing, 
the ideal was rivalry among small, atomized economic actors.  Any cooperation or concentration deviating 
from that standard was inherently suspect.  The Chicago School revolution did much to improve 
understanding of why different market structures might result in different contexts and thereby reduced rigid 
adherence to the perfectly competitive model.  Because of its benefits for allocative efficiency, competition 
nonetheless remained the touchstone of antitrust policy.
46 Fellner, William (1951) “The Influence of Market Structure on Technological Progress,” Quarterly Journal 
or Economics 65: 556-577, and Arrow (1962), supra note 90.
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greater total innovation.47  And other research suggests that oligopoly—competition among a few 
firms—is the market structure most conducive to development of new products and processes.48
There is an extensive academic literature modeling market structure and innovation, but 
much of the research on market structure and innovation has a straightforward intuition behind 
it.49 There are two opposing sets of forces shaping the relationship between market structure and 
innovation.  One, a firm facing strong product-market rivalry has an incentive to develop new 
products and processes that will help it improve or defend its market position.  Similarly, a firm 
engaged in a race with several others to develop a new patentable technology will be under 
pressure to act quickly to win the race.  At the other pole of market structure, Sir John Hicks 
famously remarked that “[the] best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” 50  Considerable 
anecdotal evidence suggests that competition drives organizations to be more innovative than do 
protected monopoly positions.  Further, a monopolist may bring product innovations slower to 
market than would a competitor because the monopolist is concerned about cannibalizing its 
existing business.51 Therefore, a monopolist might be an inferior innovator from the perspective 
of consumers.52
There are also forces affecting the relationship between market structure and innovation 
that favor market power over competition.  The possibility of sudden and sweeping entry, 
combined with large up-front investment demands, can necessitate high initial returns to allow 
47 Scherer, Frederick M. (1992) “Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism,” Journal of Economic Literature
30:1416-1433.
48 Scherer, Frederick M. (1967) “Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers.” 
American Economic Review, 57: 524-531, Scherer, Frederick M. (1967) “Research and Development 
Resource Allocation Under Rivalry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 81:359-394, Kamien and Schwartz 
(1972), supra note 40, and Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy Schwartz (1976) “On the Degree of Rivalry for 
Maximum Innovative Activity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 245-260.
49 See Scherer (1992), supra note 47, and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1989) “The Timing of Innovation: 
Research, Development, and Diffusion,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, Schmalensee and 
Willig (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland.
50 Hicks, John R. (1935) “Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly,” Econometrica 3:1-
20, AT 8. 
51 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention,” in R.R. Nelson (ed.), 
The Rate and Direction of Economic Activity (Princeton, 1962).
52 It should be observed that, in terms of efficiency, the social value of innovation is the incremental
improvement that it represents over the existing technology.  Hence, the fact that a monopolist is concerned 
with cannibalization is not entirely indicative of an efficiency problem. 
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costs to be recouped before the next innovator supplants the incumbent investor.  A firm with a 
large market share and significant market power may better amortize the fixed costs of R&D and 
reap a high percentage of the benefits of R&D.  Large, established firms might be particularly 
adept at marshaling resources for incremental innovation or for helping to bring a small firm’s 
invention to market.  Suppliers with many product-market rivals may have less ability to 
appropriate the returns from innovation that make the investment in innovation worthwhile,
either because their innovations are readily copied or invented around by rivals or because 
atomistic competitors lack the other assets needed to exploit their innovations fully (e.g., a firm 
with a small share of the product market may not amortize its cost-reducing innovation over 
many units of output).  Similarly, if many firms are racing to obtain a patent, each firm may 
conclude that its chances of winning the race are sufficiently small that it is not profitable to 
invest as much in R&D as it would without so many competitors.
Strong intellectual property rights can reduce some of the risks from innovation in 
competitive markets, specifically those associated with rapid imitation.  And licensing may make 
it possible and profitable to for an innovator to benefit from the use of its intellectual property 
throughout an industry with many firms.  However, even in the presence of strong intellectual 
property rights, other firms may develop similar or better advances and may circumvent an 
innovator’s initial patent.  These risks exist for competitive firms and product-market 
monopolists alike.  But the risk that another firm will respond to an innovation with an 
innovation of its own may grow with the number of firms competing in the relevant product 
market, at least initially.
The theoretical discussion above shows that, although economic intuition suggests an 
overarching presumption that innovation will be greatest for firms facing competitive pressures 
and the prospects of supracompetitive returns to innovation, it is also clear that, depending on 
assumptions, the theoretical balance could swing toward either a greater number of competitors 
or monopoly in a given case.
Empirical data do not resolve the ambiguous theoretical relationship between competition 
and innovation.  Many analyses supported the Schumpeterian view by finding a positive 
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correlation between market concentration and R&D investment.53  Other analyses, however, 
found data to show concentration to have a negative effect on innovation.54  An early and 
influential study by F. M. Scherer indicated that both could be correct over a sufficiently large 
range of market structures because the relationship between innovation and concentration is 
nonlinear.  His study, which corroborated the theoretical intuition discussed above, found the 
relationship between market structure and innovation to follow an inverted-U pattern: innovation 
is observed to be low at high levels of competition, reach its peak at intermediate levels of 
oligopoly (where the four leading firms control roughly half the market), and then fall off as 
market structure approaches monopoly.55  Several studies replicated and confirmed Scherer’s 
results.56
Later work, however, raised serious doubts about these findings and identified several 
reasons why one should be cautious in the interpretation of the empirical literature.  First, 
questions surround the statistical significance of the parameter estimates leading to a U-shaped 
relationship and whether they are, in fact, picking up the effects of omitted variables such as 
technological opportunity.57  Second, extreme care must be taken in interpreting cross-sectional 
studies because the causality between market structure and innovation rates can run in both 
53 See, e.g., Mansfield, Edwin (1968) Industrial Research and Technological Innovation, New York: Norton.
54 Williamson, Oliver E.  (1965) “Innovation and Market Structure.” Journal of Political Economy 73: 67-73, 
Bozeman, B., and A.N. Link (1983) Investments in Technology: Corporate Strategy and Public Policy 
Alternatives. New York: Praeger, and Mukhopadhyay, A.K. (1985) “Technological Progress and Change in 
Market Concentration in the U.S., 1963-1977.” Southern Economic Journal 52: 41-149.
55 Scherer (1967). 
56 Levin, Richard C., Wesley Cohen, and David Mowery (1985) “R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and 
Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian Hypotheses,” American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings 75: 20-4, and Scott, J.T. (1984) “Firm Versus Industry Variability in R&D 
Intensity,” in R&D, Patents and Productivity, Zvi Griliches (ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
57 See Kamien and Schwartz (1975, supra note 43, at 20-22).  Kamien and Schwartz summarized their survey 
of the empirical literature as follows:  “In reviewing the diverse findings on research efforts and 
concentration, we find little consensus” (p. 22), and “Our review of the impact of market structure on 
innovation has netted little more than reaffirmation of the early observation that both competitive pressures 
and market opportunity seem important.”  (p. 24).  Somewhat surprisingly, they then concluded their survey 
with “A new empirically inspired hypothesis has emerged to the effect that a market structure intermediate 
between monopoly and perfect competition would promote the highest rate of innovative activity.” (p. 32).
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directions.58  One detailed analysis of British data found that the higher profit expectations in 
concentrated markets increased innovative activity but that, over time, innovation reduced 
concentration levels in the sample industries.59  Many empirical studies fail to account for the 
fact that market structure itself might be affected by the perceived possibilities for innovation and 
that market structure might therefore be a result, rather than a cause, of innovation incentives.  
The literature addressing how market structure affects innovation (and vice versa) in the end 
reveals an ambiguous relationship in which factors unrelated to competition play an important 
role.  In their review of the empirical literature, Cohen and Levin concluded that “[t]ogether, 
these results leave little support for the view that industrial concentration is an independent, 
significant, and important determinant of innovative behavior and performance.” 60
The theory and data that support the systematic presumption in favor of increased 
competition for purposes of static pricing and output efficiency thus have no analog when it 
comes to understanding the optimal conditions for innovation.  By the same token, it should be 
observed that Schumpeterian claims that merger policy should favor increased concentration as a 
means of promoting innovation equally lack firm empirical grounding.  Meaningful general 
presumptions have not been identified: innovation is affected by a variety of market factors other 
than concentration (as well as variables related to a firm’s regulatory status, products, and 
technologies).  Although more rivals rather than fewer will often remain the correct decision in a 
particular case, enforcement authorities cannot confidently presume as a matter of economic 
theory or experience that more competitors are beneficial or that market power is detrimental for 
R&D, except in the limited case of merger to monopoly where the evidence supports a moderate 
58 In terms of theory, a recent demonstration of this possibility is provided in a paper by Jan Boone, which 
finds that an increase in the intensity of competition can drive a leading firm to increase its innovation by 
relatively more than its rivals and thus increase future concentration.  (Boone, Jan (2001) “Intensity of 
competition and the incentive to innovate,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 19:705-26.)
59 Geroski, Paul A. (1990) “Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure,” Oxford Economic 
Papers 42: 586-602.
60 Cohen, Wesley M., and Richard C. Levin (1989) “Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure” in 
Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. II, Schmalensee and Willig (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland, 
citing Cohen, Wesley M., Richard Levin, and David Mowery (1987) “Firm Size and R&D Intensity: A Re-
Examination,” Journal of Industrial Economics 35: 543-65.
26
presumption of harm.  Importantly, however, nor can merger authorities presume with any 
confidence that increased concentration, firm size, or market power will be beneficial for R&D.
Where do the above results leave merger authorities?  Although the available data and 
theory show it is impossible to make definitive general statements about the linkage between 
market structure and innovation, they also show that one can often make reasonable predictions 
about the effects of specific transactions within a particular industry based on a fact-intensive 
investigation into the incentives and capabilities of actual and potential innovators.  We think 
such fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries are the better course than the systematic retreat from 
enforcement in dynamic settings for which the “Schumpeterian” school argues.
2. The R&D-Consumer Welfare Relationship
Once an agency makes a prediction about a merger's likely effect on innovation, an issue arises 
that does not come up in the analysis of conventional, static concerns.  Although it is extremely 
counterintuitive to many people, a large body of economics literature has established theoretical 
reasons why profit-maximizing firms may invest more in R&D than is socially efficient.61  An 
important implication is that the social welfare effects of an innovation-reducing merger may be 
positive.  Patent races are one situation in which firms may invest excessive amounts of R&D in 
order to innovate quickly.  In a race to obtain a pharmaceutical patent, for example, preempting
rivals by a day may allow a pharmaceutical firm to obtain intellectual property rights whose value 
far exceeds the social benefits of having the patented drug available one day sooner.62 Society 
would have done better if the duplicative R&D resources were invested elsewhere and the 
innovation obtained a day later. In other situations, an innovation may allow a supplier to 
increase its share of the economic pie without increasing the total pie (e.g., a product or database 
61 For a survey, see Reinganum (1989), supra note 49.
62 Similar effects may arise when being first to market creates a durable advantage in terms of favorable 
consumer perceptions.
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innovation may facilitate price discrimination having these effects).  Such an innovation might 
have private value for the innovator but no overall social value.63
The theoretical possibility of excessive private incentives notwithstanding, as an 
empirical matter private incentives to invest in R&D typically are too low.64  This situation arises 
because private firms are generally unable to appropriate fully the benefits that their R&D 
generates for the economy.65  Of course, “typically” is not synonymous with “always.”  Under 
specific conditions, firms can have socially excessive innovation incentives, and one can 
examine any particular market to determine if those conditions are present.
Whether enforcement authorities would want to act when such conditions for 
overinvestment in innovation hold, however, raises the possible tension between consumer 
welfare and social welfare when merger policy focuses on innovation rather than static 
competition.  This is so because consumers almost always benefit from increased R&D.  Even in 
patent race models, it is possible that consumers would be better off if firms invested still more 
and thus brought the fruits of innovation to the market even faster.66 We discuss the possible 
trade-off from allowing mergers that reduce inefficient innovation in the efficiencies section 
below.
63 A firm might also engage in predatory innovation (see, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, A.O. Sykes, and Robert D. 
Willig (1985) “Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms toward the Producers of 
Complementary Products” in Antitrust and Regulation: Essays in Memory of John J. McGowan, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA.), although this is likely to more an issue of monopolization or attempted 
monopolization rather than merger.  Business stealing effects might also be a more important source of 
distortion than in the case of price competition because the real resource costs of innovation mean that the 
rivals’ losses to translate dollar for dollar into another economic agent’s gain.  Lastly, in markets with 
network effects, excessive innovation competition to attract new consumers may have the effect of stranding 
the installed base of customers with an old, incompatible technology.
64 See, e.g., Griliches, Zvi (1992) “The Search for R&D Spillovers,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
94(Supp.): 29-47, and Jones, Charles I., and John C. Williams (1998) “Measuring the Social Return to 
R&D,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 1119-35.
65 Carlton and Gertner (2003) point out that empirical studies generally compare average private and social 
returns, while the privately and socially optimal R&D levels depend on marginal returns.   In settings where 
R&D investment is driven by preemption incentives, the private marginal returns may deviate from the 
private average returns by more than the marginal social returns deviate from the average social returns, 
suggesting that perhaps excessive private incentives would be a problem.  It is far from evident, however, 
that patent pre-emption incentives are of empirical significance in many industries.  (Carlton, Dennis W., 
and Robert H. Gertner (2003) “Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior” in Innovation Policy 
and the Economy, Vol. 3, Jafee, Lerner, and Stern (ed.s), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.)
66 The source of the socially excessive R&D is the fact that the innovating firm’s rivals may see their profits 
fall as a result of the innovation, and the innovator does not count this reduction in total surplus as a cost.
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In the end, we conclude from the economic evidence that the concentration-competition-
welfare presumption is—at present—weak for the innovation effects of mergers.  One exception 
is merger to monopoly, which can leave a firm facing little pressure to race to innovate and 
diminished incentives to engage in follow-on innovations that could cannibalize revenues from 
the firm’s existing products combine.  Moreover, in the face of potential entry, such a firm is 
more like to attain intellectual property rights solely to block potential rivals from attaining them, 
rather than to bring improved products to market.  In contrast, with two or more incumbents, 
there is a free-rider problem with respect to entry deterrence, and thus entry deterrence of this 
sort is less likely.  Further—and moving beyond a traditional competitive analysis—a firm that 
lacks rivals against which to benchmark itself may be a less efficient innovator.  For these 
reasons, we believe that economic analysis supports  a presumption of harm to innovation in the 
case of merger to monopoly.67
It is important to recognize that the general lack of a presumption in one direction does 
not imply a presumption in the opposite direction.  Although the evidence does not support a 
general claim that consolidation reduces innovation, it also does not support the opposite 
presumption that consolidation will increase innovation.  Hence, the lack of a presumptive link 
between market structure and innovation (outside of the monopoly context) undermines not just 
the conventional presumption in merger cases but also the “Schumpeterian” argument against 
merger enforcement where innovation is at stake.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the claim for systematic laissez faire in 
technologically dynamic markets is not soundly grounded in economics.  It will not always or 
even often be true that unchecked consolidation will produce the conditions fostering the intense 
investment in new technology that leads to sequential competition “for the market,” as the 
“Schumpeterians” sometimes argue.68  Although the current product-market shares of most firms 
might well be largely irrelevant to merger enforcement in such cases, it would be a mistake to 
think the irrelevance of current market shares inexorably leads to permissive merger policy.  
Indeed, a merger policy designed to foster and protect dynamic competition might appear fairly 
67 In terms of welfare effects, our earlier caveats regarding cannibalization (supra notes ___ and ___) stands.
68 Indeed, case 2 in section II, infra, is one in which a merger would be challenged precisely because it would 
otherwise undermine Schumpeterian competition. 
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restrictive when viewed through the lens of conventional merger analysis.  For instance, the 
Schumpeterian approach might instead imply that the current dominant firm should be allowed to 
merge with essentially no other firm because any other firm might be the next successful rival.  
Similarly, it might be socially optimal to block a merger between two firms that currently had no 
product-market sales because each was involved in R&D that might make it the next market 
winner. The key point is that, to understand a proposed merger’s potential effects on 
Schumpeterian competition, one would need to ask which firms have the potential to engage in 
innovation that could challenge the position of the dominant firm and then have a framework for 
understanding how the merger would affect the incentives and abilities of those firms to engage 
in development and deployment of new technology. 
In summary, consolidation can cause harm depending on the particular facts of the case, 
and we think those facts should therefore become central to the merger analysis.  When the 
government can marshal evidence of harm to innovation, we think the better policy is to give the 
government the opportunity to present that evidence in an enforcement case, not to free merging 
parties at the outset from having to rebut the evidence.  We conclude that in mergers short of 
monopoly, the government should have no presumption of harm to innovation and should bear 
the initial burden of proving harm that the defendant would then have to rebut.  In mergers to 
monopoly, we think that there should be a presumption of harm and that defendants should carry 
the initial burden of rebutting that presumption with evidence that there would be no reduction in 
innovation from the merger or that any reduction would bring with it compensating efficiencies.
This section has tried to demonstrate an important, overarching fact: the market structures 
that promote innovation need not align with the market structures that systematically promote 
efficient, short-run price and output levels.  Consequently, conventional presumptions and 
conventional ways of making predictions about a transaction’s welfare effects may need 
rethinking where technological change is an important market feature.  We turn next to how 
specific steps in the current enforcement framework affect, and may be affected by, technological 
change.  We begin with market definition, the exercise that lies at the heart of the traditional 
merger review process.
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IV. Market Definition
Even in the absence of innovation, there are two broad concerns about the importance that is 
attached to market definition in merger review.  First, there is a question of whether market 
definition is, in fact, necessary to a sound analysis of the consumer-welfare and efficiency effects 
of a merger.  Second, there are concerns that the mechanics of formal market definition may 
actually be an obstacle to good analysis in some instances.  Innovation heightens these two 
concerns both with respect to static analyses of price and output effects and to dynamic analyses 
of investment and innovation.
In order to understand the concerns about merger policy’s emphasis on defining markets, 
it is useful to describe in more detail the mechanics of market definition.  There is a long-
standing principle by which economists define the product scope of a market: two goods or 
services are in the same relevant market if and only if consumers view them as sufficiently close 
substitutes.69  A similar logic is used for geographic scope.  When are substitutes sufficiently 
close that they should be included in the same market?  To some extent, chocolates compete with 
automobiles for consumers’ dollars, but one should not conclude that chocolates and automobiles 
are in the same product market.  To give more precision to the concept of sufficiently close 
substitutes, economists undertaking market delineation exercises often conduct the so-called 
hypothetical monopolist test.  This test asks whether a hypothetical, profit-maximizing 
monopolist over a group of products in a given area could profitably raise prices above a 
specified level by a small but significant amount for a sustained period of time.70  The group of 
products considered in the test comprises a candidate relevant market. The actual relevant market 
is the smallest set of products the monopolist would need to control in order to raise prices 
profitably.71
69 See, e.g., Stocking, George W., and Willard F. Mueller (1955) “The Cellophane Case and the New 
Competition,” American Economic Review 45: 29-63, at 44-8.
70 Merger Guidelines, Section 1.0; FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (D.D.C. 2000); 
California v. Sutter Health Systems, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  See, also, Katz, 
Michael L., and Carl Shapiro (2003) “Critical loss: Let’s tell the whole story,” Antitrust Spring: 49-56.
71 Merger Guidelines, Sections 1.0 and 1.11.
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A price increase will raise a hypothetical monopolist’s profits unless unit sales volume 
falls sufficiently to offset the higher price received for the units sold.72  Thus, the hypothetical 
monopolist test indicates that a set of products or a geographical area constitutes a relevant 
market if the hypothetical monopolist could make a small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in price without causing enough consumers to switch to substitute goods so that the 
price increase becomes unprofitable.
The hypothetical monopolist test is used both by enforcement agencies and by the courts 
that review agency actions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for example, 
reversed the FTC’s injunction of a merger between two hospitals in a single town on the grounds 
that the FTC had failed to show that its narrow definition of the relevant market could satisfy the 
hypothetical monopolist test.73
A. Implications of Innovation for the Use of Market Definition to Predict the 
Static Price Effects of a Merger
Consider first the role of market definition in the analysis of traditional, static price and output 
effects.  Clearly, one cannot predict the competitive effects of a merger without developing some 
sense of the competitors and the constraints that they apply to the merging parties’ behavior.  It is 
important to know whether—prior to the merger—rivalry between the merging parties was 
critical in driving them to serve consumer interests.  Consequently, the need for market 
definition, broadly conceived, is not in doubt.  What is in doubt is the need to define bright-line 
boundaries through application of a formal algorithm that is applied separately from the analysis 
of competitive effects.
Indeed, the very question asked by the hypothetical monopolist test raises issues about 
this separation.  Under the Merger Guidelines’ approach, the answer to the following question 
provides the basis of market definition: Would a hypothetical monopolist with control and 
ownership of a particular set of products be able to raise price profitably in a significant way, 
holding the prices of other products constant?  But why not make predictions about what actual
suppliers would do rather than focus on a hypothetical monopolist?  Specifically, why not ask 
72 We are assuming that the baseline price is greater than or equal to incremental cost.
73 FTC. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d  1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
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directly whether the merging parties would find it profitable to raise price by a significant amount 
post merger?  That is the question whose answer matters for consumer welfare.74  If one 
possesses the answer to that question, then the answer to the hypothetical monopolist question is 
completely superfluous.
There is emerging recognition that a proper economic analysis of a merger’s effects does 
not require formal definition of bright-line boundaries.  Proponents of the view that market 
definition may be superfluous include former chief economists of both principal U.S. antitrust 
agencies.  For example, Professor Jonathan Baker, a former Director of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Economics, observed:
Indeed, if a merger can be shown to harm competition directly, antitrust should 
not need to spend much effort on market definition … .  [I]f the likely harm to 
competition from a merger can be demonstrated directly, there exists a market 
where harm will occur, but there is little need to specify the market’s precise 
boundaries.75
Similarly, Professor Janusz Ordover, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic 
Analysis at the Department of Justice, wrote:
From the perspective of economic theory, antitrust law’s preoccupation with 
market definition has always seemed somewhat peculiar.  Arguments for and 
against a merger that turn upon distinctions between broad and narrow market 
definitions are, to an economic purist, an inadequate substitute for, and a diversion 
from, sound direct assessment of a merger’s effect.76
Numerous courts and agencies have also made the point that market definition is an 
indirect way of showing a merger’s effects that should not stand in the way of considering direct 
evidence of competitive harm, although generally in antitrust contexts outside of merger review. 
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “[i]f a 
plaintiff can show that a defendant’s conduct exerted an actual adverse effect on competition . . . 
74 One answer is that the second question does not entail holding other prices fixed.  But in unilateral effects 
cases, an assumption along somewhat similar lines is made.
75 Baker, Jonathan B.  (1997) “Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis,” George Mason Law Review 5: 
347-61.
76 Ordover, Janusz A., and Daniel M. Wall (1989) “Understanding Econometric Methods of Market 
Definition.” Antitrust, 3: 20-25, at 20-1[footnote omitted].
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this arguably is more direct evidence of market power than calculations of elusive market share 
figures.”77 The Supreme Court held in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists that 
[s]ince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to 
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output’ 
can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is ‘but a surrogate 
for detrimental effects.’78
If the formalities of market definition can be skipped in favor of direct analysis of harm in 
monopolization and collusion cases, there is no reason the same should not hold true for merger 
analysis where the issue—likely competitive harm—is similar. To be sure, merger analysis is 
often more prospective and predictive than other kind of antitrust cases where the conduct at 
issue frequently has been ongoing for some time. But that simply means direct effects may be 
easier to show in non-merger cases and not that direct evidence of market power shouldn’t have
the same priority in merger cases where such evidence is available.
Unfortunately, the conventional separation of market definition from the analysis of 
actual competitive effects in merger analysis leads to a convention in which the plaintiff’s burden 
to establish boundaries of relevant markets is often interpreted as an obligation to establish “the” 
bright-line boundary.  Hence, some courts might dismiss or discount the plaintiff’s case for being 
unable to establish a clear market boundary.  Indeed, the Justice Department lost its bid to block 
the merger between Oracle and PeopleSoft in large part because the trial court found that the 
Department failed to prove the product and geographic markets it had alleged in its complaint.79
Interestingly, the trial judge in Oracle was well aware that it could be “difficult to identify ‘clear 
breaks in the chain of substitutes’ sufficient to justify bright-line market boundaries,” especially 
in markets with similar but differentiated products.80  But the court’s recognition of the difficulty 
of defining such clear market boundaries did not lead it to lessen the government’s burden of 
proving a market definition that would support its unilateral effects theory of harm in the case.  
77 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2nd Cir. 2001).
78 FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, ___ (1986) (partly quoting 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust 
Law ¶ 1511, p.429 (1986)).
79 U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18063 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2004).
80 Ibid at 41.
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Similarly, in another recent case, the FTC lost its suit to enjoin Arch Coal’s acquisition of Triton 
Coal because the district court found the Commission had not met its burden of proving that the 
market should be defined to include 8800 Btu coal and to exclude 8400 Btu coal.81  Accordingly, 
the court ruled that both should be included in the relevant market.  But the boundaries of actual 
competition may not be as sharp as the in-or-out approach the court took in Arch.
A more rational approach would recognize the inherent uncertainty and take it into 
account.82  One way to do so would be to ask where the dividing line matters, allow the plaintiffs 
and defendants to make their arguments about on which side of the critical line the “actual” 
market boundary lies without a requirement of certainty, and then assess the potential 
competitive harms in the light of the uncertainty the fuzzy market definition creates for 
predicting that harm will occur.  Plaintiffs would not be held to a standard of establishing a 
unique, bright-line boundary with a high degree of certainty.83
The presence of significant innovation exacerbates the strains already present in market 
definition because the characteristics of various suppliers’ differentiated products may constantly 
shift in significant ways, making it especially hard to draw bright-line market boundaries with 
certainty.  Significant innovation also raises at least two new issues with respect to market 
definition for an analysis of static pricing effects.  First, some commentators have objected to the 
nature of the price changes used in conducting the hypothetical monopolist test when there is 
significant ongoing technological progress.  Second, rapid innovation can make it difficult to 
define relevant product markets because business executives and government officials alike may 
not yet know what the future products will be.
Consider first the issue of the price changes used in conducting the hypothetical 
monopolist test.  Under American and European Union competition policy, a small but 
significant price increase in the context of the hypothetical monopolist test is often taken to mean 
81 FTC v. Arch Coal Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15996 (D.D.C. Aug 16, 2004).
82 As we discuss in Section VI.D below, there is a general failure of merger enforcement to address 
uncertainty in a rational manner.
83 They would, however, have to establish a likelihood of significant harm to competition.
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a price change in the range of 5 to 10 percent. 84  Several different criticisms have been made 
regarding application of this approach to markets with rapid technological progress, where 
quality-adjusted prices might fall by 20 percent or more annually.85
One critique is that a 5- or 10-percent price increase may be an inappropriate test because 
it may either understate or overstate the merged firm’s market power when costs and quality-
adjusted prices are routinely changing by much greater amounts.86 This criticism would be 
appropriate if enforcement authorities took current prices as the baseline.  For instance, if 
innovation is driving costs down significantly, then merely holding prices constant at the pre-
merger baseline could be indicative of the exercise of substantially increased market power 
because profit margins would have in increased significantly. Conversely, in a market where 
prices were rising on a nominal basis but costs were rising faster because innovation was leading 
to higher-quality, but more-expensive-to-produce goods, a 10-percent price increase over the pre-
merger baseline might be competitive pricing and reflect no market power at all.  What is needed 
is a careful analysis of what constitutes a real price increase in the face of cost and product 
changes.  Stated another way, what is needed is a comparison of alternative price paths, 
84 Merger Guidelines, Section 1.11 (“In attempting to determine objectively the effect of a ‘small but 
significant and nontransitory’ increase in price, the Agency, in most contexts, will use a price increase of 
five percent lasting for the foreseeable future.”).  European Commission, 1997, Commission Notice of the 
Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law. 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevma_en.html) (“The question to be answered is 
whether the parties’ customers would switch to readily available substitutes or to suppliers located 
elsewhere in response to an hypothetical small (in the range 5%-10%), permanent relative price increase in 
the products and areas being considered.”).
For most mergers, pre-merger prices are taken at the benchmark.  In cases where pre-merger prices reflect 
coordinated behavior, some measure of a competitive price is used instead.  Merger Guidelines, Section 
1.11. 
85 In addition to the issues in the text, Hartman et al. offer another criticism of the standard hypothetical 
monopolist approach to market definition.  Their criticism, however, appears to be based on a 
misunderstanding of the Merger Guidelines.  Hartman et al. write that "During [the 1970s] a variety of 
[minicomputer] systems competed on price and performance while exhibiting price differences of several 
hundred percent.  Strict interpretation of the Merger Guidelines suggests that such price differences imply 
that the products are in different markets."  (Hartman, Raymond, David Teece, Will Mitchell, and Thomas 
Jorde (1993) “Assessing Market Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change,” Industrial and 
Corporate Change 2: 317-350, at 323.)  The hypothetical monopolist test, however, is based on the effects 
of price changes, not existing price differentials.
86 See, e.g., Pleatsikas, Christopher, and David Teece (2001) “The Analysis of Market Definition and Market 
Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19:665-693, 
at 671, who argue that markets will be too narrowly defined.
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recognizing that prices might well have changed over time even in the absence of the merger 
under examination.  Without such a comparison, the hypothetical monopolist test can be applied 
in ways that generate misleading conclusions.
A related criticism is that the hypothetical monopolist approach to defining market 
boundaries conducts a test based on the assumption that other suppliers hold their prices constant 
when such prices may in fact be falling.  This criticism is somewhat misplaced; under the 
hypothetical monopolist test, the prices of potential substitute products are assumed not to 
change in response to a change in the monopolist’s price, but this assumption does not preclude 
the possibility of technological progress as a driver of price changes over time.  This criticism 
and the one preceding it do, however, raise an important question: What baseline prices for the 
hypothetical monopolist and other suppliers should be used in defining the product scope of a 
market with rapid technological progress?  Specifically, should one use current or future prices?
Because the concern of merger analysis is with post-merger market performance, we 
believe that it is more appropriate to use projections of future prices.  Of course, forming reliable 
projections can sometimes be difficult, and this difficulty can be compounded by the fact that 
innovation can itself be affected by the merger.  Moreover, when technological progress is 
ongoing, the scope of the product market may continue to change, so that multiple projections are 
necessary.  However, relying on current prices can lead to market definitions that are either too 
narrow (when technological progress in substitute products is rapid) or too broad (when the 
hypothetical monopolist’s product is subject to greater technological progress than are substitute 
products).87
Put differently, the issue is that the agencies and the courts may not know which products 
will be viable substitutes in the near future.  Under the traditional approach to market definition, 
the central aim, whether one uses the hypothetical monopolist test or some other algorithm, is to 
identify existing products that are at present meaningful substitutes for one another from a 
consumer’s perspective.  When innovation is significant, the analysis may need to be much more 
87 For the latter reason, Pleatsikas and Teece are incorrect when they assert that “defining markets from a 
static perspective when innovation is rapid will inevitably lead to identification of markets that are too 
narrow.”  Pleatsikas and Teece 2001, supra note 86, at 687. See also Teece, David, and Mary Coleman
(1998) “The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High Technology Industries,” Antitrust Bulletin,
43: 801-857, at 826-828).
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forward-looking.  Innovation may result in the creation of new products that compete in the 
relevant market, or innovation may lower the costs of producing existing products that are, at 
present, too expensive to be considered viable substitutes for the products of the merging parties.
The brevity of our discussion to this point should not be taken as a sign that the 
difficulties of forming reliable projections are minor or readily dealt with.  Conceptually, the 
issues are straightforward and are compatible with the Merger Guidelines’ market definition 
framework, as long as that framework is applied on a forward-looking basis.  In practice, there 
are two problems.  First, actually projecting future substitution possibilities in a fast-changing 
and highly uncertain environment is often difficult. Second, the agencies generally limit the 
extent to which they take a forward-looking view.88  Their short-range perspective is in part a 
reaction to practical difficulties but, as we discuss below in Part VI.D, the agencies generally 
have not made use of well-established tools of decision theory that could provide a more 
coherent approach for decision making under uncertainty and do a better job of taking possible, 
future events into account. Although adopting these tools would benefit merger review in every 
case, it is particularly important given the effect innovation can have on products and production 
processes.
B. The Role of Market Definition in Predicting the Innovation Effects of a 
Merger
The discussion above addresses how innovation can complicate market definition for purposes of 
gauging a merger’s effects on price and output in a relevant product market.  What about the use 
of market definition to assess a merger’s effects on innovation itself? The purpose of defining 
relevant markets is to identify the boundaries of competition in order to make predictions about 
post-merger price and output levels.  When the question instead involves post- merger innovation
levels, a fundamental issue is whether a focus on product markets is appropriate to the analysis.  
An argument in favor of taking a product-market focus is that the ultimate aim of innovation—
and the way in which it affects consumers—is the creation of products and processes that allow 
an innovator (or its licensees) to compete successfully in one or more product markets.  An 
88 For example, the Merger Guidelines (Section 3) indicate that the agencies generally will to look only two 
years forward in considering entry, although the Merger Guidelines provide no rationale for this cutoff.
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argument against this approach is the claim that the notion of a well-defined product market is 
too limiting because the products of the future cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty
and, more fundamentally, that a sustained stream of innovations rather than any particular 
product is in the long run most important for consumer welfare. A potential response is to 
consider markets defined in terms of innovation capabilities rather than specific products.  But 
even here one must ultimately tie the analysis to some notion of commonality if not (potential) 
competition among products to know which innovation capabilities are relevant.
Consider two firms wishing to merge that have strong R&D capabilities in similar areas 
but are not at present significant product-market competitors with one another. From the 
standpoint of static price competition, presumptively no public policy rationale exists for 
blocking the merger.  But if the firms are the only two or are among the few firms that have the 
capability to undertake particular innovation efforts, then the antitrust agencies might nonetheless 
be concerned with the consumer-welfare effects of the proposed merger.
Antitrust enforcers might be concerned either that: (a) the two firms would have 
otherwise engaged in competing R&D efforts that would have led to their becoming direct, 
product-market competitors, or (b) the merged firm will reduce its R&D and lower the 
probability that even one supplier brings out improved products or processes.  The first of these 
concerns is ultimately about potential competition in the particular product market(s) at issue in 
the merger.  The second concern, however, is squarely about innovation and arises even when—
in the non-merger counterfactual—the innovation under consideration might not lead to product-
market competition between the merging firms. The same two concerns arise when the merging 
parties compete in what today are unconcentrated markets but where the firms are the only two or 
are among the few firms that have the capability to undertake substantial innovation efforts 
necessary to develop future products in this area.
These two concerns raise legal and economic issues for market definition and the 
subsequent competitive-effects analysis. A first issue arises from the fact that potential 
competition cases are difficult to bring successfully in the United States. Courts tend to be 
skeptical of claims that a merger will harm consumers by reducing future competition between 
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two merging firms that are not at present competing with one another.89  A second issue is that it 
may be extremely difficult to define a product market if one does not yet know what the product 
will be. A third issue is that changes in upstream innovation can have effects on multiple 
downstream product markets. A fourth consideration is that, as discussed above, the relationship 
between competition and innovation is much less understood than that between competition and 
price or output levels.
In response to these difficulties and to the absence of any express provisions in the 
Merger Guidelines for dealing with innovation, enforcement officials and policy makers have 
proposed various ways to make market definition more dynamic and sensitive to innovation 
considerations. One such approach focuses neither on final product markets nor on innovation 
itself, but on “technology markets.” Technology is a product that can result from innovation.  In 
some cases, technology is fully embodied in some other product that is sold in the marketplace 
(e.g., when innovation produces technology that improves the performance of a home-electronics 
component or of some machine tool).  In other cases the technology itself is sold in the 
marketplace and used as an input not by the innovating firm that produced the technology, but by 
its customers who in turn incorporate the component into the product they sell to consumers 
(e.g., a biotechnology patent that the inventor licenses to a pharmaceutical company that 
incorporates the invention in a drug sold to consumers).
Even though technology markets are—in the end—just product markets, examining them 
as a separate category may have the virtue of highlighting the importance of innovation by 
focusing enforcement attention on a set of products that results from the process of research and 
development rather than from manufacturing or the direct provision of services.  Moreover, 
technology markets have some notable features that are relevant to market definition and that 
may distinguish them from more conventional goods and services markets. For example: (a) 
production is often highly uncertain; (b) they are intermediate goods markets and can have strong 
vertical issues; and (c) the output is information for which the marginal costs are very low 
89 General principles of antitrust law require “clear proof” or at least a “reasonable probability” that entry into 
the new market would in fact have occurred in the near future and disallow speculation about “ephemeral 
possibilities.” (United States v. Marine Bancorp, 418 U.S. 602, 617, 623 (1974); Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 
F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982); In re B.A.T. Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852, 919-928 (1984).)
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relative to average costs (or first-copy costs) and there can be well-known difficulties selling 
information, such as those related to protection against expropriation.90
Technology markets may also have quite different geographical features than do 
traditional product markets. We note at the outset that geographic market definition is a poorly 
understood subject even in the absence of innovation, with much confusion about whether a 
geographic market refers to suppliers, customers, or both. The presence of innovation—
specifically, an important role for intellectual property sold in technology markets—can 
compound the problems. The reason is that intellectual property can typically be shipped 
anywhere in the world at an extremely low cost.91 Given the low costs of transporting 
information, the location at which technology is developed has no effect on the cost of providing 
the subsequent intellectual property for use anywhere in the world. But does this mean the 
geographic scope of technology markets is global?
One approach to defining the geographic scope of relevant markets is explicitly to define 
both the buyers and sellers of concern in a particular investigation. For jurisdictional reasons, the 
federal agencies and the courts focus on effects on consumers located in the United States.  The 
remaining issue is where the parties who can compete to serve American consumers are located.
We would expect that suppliers located anywhere in the world could compete to supply pure
intellectual property, but there are limitations that should be taken into account.  For instance, 
location may affect the innovation process (proximity to specific scientists, information about 
consumer wants, etc), and intellectual property may be useful only in certain locations because of 
the need for complementary products or due to differences in legal regimes.92  In cases where the 
technology is not sold separately but is embodied in other products, foreign suppliers often will 
not have the complementary assets to serve American consumers.  So the answer may be very 
90 For a seminal analysis, see Arrow, Kenneth (1962) “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention,” in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, R.R. Nelson (ed.), New York: Princeton 
University Press.
91 The cost of shipping intellectual property is not always small.  For example, the intellectual property may 
consist of tacit knowledge of collections of employees.
92 Our presumption about the global nature of pure technology markets is in accord with the presumption 
found elsewhere that innovation markets would have global geographic scope.See Richard J. Gilbert and 
Steven C. Sunshine, “Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: the Use of 
Innovation Markets,” 63 Antitrust L.J. 569 (1995).  
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different when a pure technology market is at issue from when the results of innovation are fully 
embodied in another product.
As discussed above, R&D and technology are quite different.  R&D is the process of 
innovation, and technology is a product that can result from that innovation. To focus on 
technology markets is, therefore, to focus on an intermediate product market closely tied to 
innovation, not on the process of innovation itself. The shortcoming of using “technology 
markets” to address innovation is that defining such markets at best allows one to measure R&D 
activity through its generation of concrete, marketable results, which can be an imperfect proxy 
for a process that may yield incremental improvements that are not in themselves marketable or 
innovations that take some time to be recognized or reduced to practice. A further limitation of 
the technology-markets approach on its own terms is that it does not address the enormous 
amount of technology that firms produce for internal rather than market consumption; innovation 
which is of no less interest  than innovation aimed at creating technology for license.93
To shift the focus or merger review further from product markets and more directly to 
investment in research and development, Richard Gilbert and Steven Sunshine, both at the time 
working at the Department of Justice, developed the concept of “innovation markets.”94 The 
import of their contribution is to shift attention away from potential product competition and 
toward actual innovation competition. In Gilbert and Sunshine’s words, “[t]he innovation 
markets framework provides a methodology for identifying mergers that are likely to affect 
competition in output markets through a lessening of innovation.”95  Their proposed framework 
consists of five principal steps: (1) identify overlapping R&D activities of the merging firms; (2) 
identify alternative sources of R&D; (3) evaluate actual and potential downstream competitors to 
the merging parties; (4) assess how the increased concentration in R&D would affect investment 
in R&D; and (5) evaluate how the merger would affect the efficiency of R&D. 
93 One might simply include such in-house technology in the relevant market, but there can be severe practical 
difficulties obtaining output measures for this technology, as well as conceptual issues concerning the extent 
to which such technology provides meaningful competition to third-party innovators.
94 Richard J. Gilbert and Steven C. Sunshine, “Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger 
Analysis: the Use of Innovation Markets,” 63 Antitrust L.J. 569 (1995).
95 Ibid at ___.
42
Although each of those steps is in the abstract a tall order, Gilbert and Sunshine limited 
the scope of their proposal to cases in which specific R&D activities could be identified that 
could have a potentially significant impact on specific downstream product markets. They 
further recommended that their approach be applied only “to markets in which R&D directed 
toward particular new products or processes requires specific assets that are possessed by 
identified firms.”96 Taken together, these qualifications limit the use of innovation markets to 
cases in which innovation is at a sufficiently advanced stage that its effects on downstream 
markets can reasonably be predicted and in which the pool of relevant innovators can be 
determined with a high degree of certainty.97
Despite the cautious way Gilbert and Sunshine recommended using innovation markets, 
the idea has met with substantial skepticism and criticism.98 One commentator argued that the 
innovation market idea is in most cases “superfluous” and amounts to little more than analysis of 
potential competition in product markets, while in the remaining cases it is a dangerous foray 
into unknown economic relationships that promises to do at least as much harm as good.99
Professor Dennis Carlton testified before the FTC that it would be too difficult in practice for 
antitrust agencies successfully to identify mergers that should be blocked on innovation grounds,
and he opined that “a movement toward relying on the concept of innovation markets could 
easily lead to a vast decline in the predictability of enforcement policy and in the reliability of 
enforcement in improving welfare.”100 Yet others have questioned the legal basis on which 
enforcement agencies and courts could base decisions on non-price effects like innovation.
In the light of such criticism, it is perhaps not surprising that the innovation markets 
concept has not to date significantly affected the outcomes of merger cases, although it has 
96 Ibid at ___.
97 Similarly, former FTC Chairman Tim Muris has warned against using the innovation market concept unless 
it is obvious who the potential innovators are. See Statement of Chairman Timothy Muris on Genzyme 
Corp’s Acquisition of Novazyme Corp. (2004).
98 See Ronald W. Davis, “Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective,” 71 
Antitrust L.J. 677 (2003) for a useful survey of arguments for and against the use of  innovation markets. 
99 Richard T. Rapp, “The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis,” 64 
Antitrust L.J. 19 (1995).
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affected the agencies’ analysis and discussion in a growing number of investigations.101 If 
nothing else, innovation has become a focal point that has aided in understanding the potential 
product-market effects of mergers in dynamic markets, and the innovation-markets approach has 
helped the agencies look more deeply into the future impacts of transactions that would pose 
little concern viewed through a static framework geared solely to price and output effects in 
product markets with their current structures.
We think the underlying idea of the innovation markets approach—that the set of 
competitors is sometimes best identified by examining which firms have the skills and assets 
needed to innovate effectively—is a sound one. Now that innovation has become part of the 
picture in merger review, however, there are important questions about how to approach market 
definition in cases that do not fit the strict potential-competition parameters that Gilbert and 
Sunshine established for their innovation-market framework.102  Both the technology-markets 
and innovation-markets approaches leave open important questions and have limited application 
for a number of issues that mergers raise for technological progress. First, the restriction of focus 
to innovation tied to actual or imminent product markets in the respective approaches does not 
provide guidance as to whether and how merger authorities should account for innovation that is 
not connected to any specific current or future product. Second, both approaches incorporate the 
traditional emphasis on market definition but do not address the limitations of market definition 
or how its application might need to be modified to address innovation. Gilbert and Sunshine 
recognize the difficulty of defining innovation markets and therefore limit their proposal to 
situations in which agencies can identify with reasonable certainty the pool of potential 
innovators. But neither the technology-markets nor the innovation-markets framework provides 
guidance on what, if anything, a finding of increased competition means for innovation or of 
what welfare presumptions enforcement officials should apply once they have defined markets 
100 Dennis W. Carlton, “Antitrust Policy Toward Mergers when Firms Innovate: Should Antitrust Recognize 
the Doctrine of Innovation Markets?” Testimony before the Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Global 
and Innovation-based Competition, Oct. 25, 1995, www.ftc.gov/opp/global/carlton.htm.
101 See Davis, supra note___ at; Richard J. Gilbert and Willard K. Tom, “Is Innovation King at the Antitrust 
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later,” 69 Antitrust L.J. 43 (2001).
102 As a pragmatic matter, it may also be less necessary now for purposes of policy acceptance to fit innovation 
as closely to the methodology established by the Merger Guidelines than it was when the innovation 
markets concept was first introduced.
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for innovation or technology. As we discussed above in Part III.1 of this article, findings of 
increased concentration at best support only very weak presumptions about effects on innovation. 
The most important aspects of determining innovation-related welfare effects of a merger are 
therefore not likely to center on market definition but on more direct, factual evidence of 
alternative sources of innovation and of the economic incentives of the potential merger partners.
We turn now to the next step in the merger review framework, in which the Guidelines 
turn to that more specific factual inquiry, and examine how innovation affects the further 
analysis, beyond market share, of a merger’s likely competitive effects. 
V. Further Analysis of Competitive Effects
As a legal matter, if the plaintiffs establish that a merger will lead to high levels of concentration, 
then it falls to the defendants to rebut the presumption of a competitive problem by pointing to 
other factors, such as the possibility of entry by new competitors or certain market characteristics 
that can make it difficult to raise prices (e.g., the presence of large, sophisticated buyers who can 
exert bargaining pressure).  As the Merger Guidelines recognize, “market share and 
concentration data provide only the starting point for analyzing the competitive impact of a 
merger.”103  A complete analysis considers both the abilities and incentives of competitors to 
expand their output levels and/or change the attributes of their products in response to price 
changes by the merging parties that would harm consumers.
A. Implications of Innovation for Further Analysis of Static Competition
We begin our discussion of further competitive analysis by briefly considering the implications 
of innovation for static pricing effects.  Specifically, we examine the implications of innovation 
for entry by new suppliers and product repositioning by existing suppliers.  There are two 
situations to consider with respect to entry.  In one, the likelihood of entry is independent of 
whether or not the merging parties would otherwise raise their pre-entry prices.  In the other, the 
likelihood of entry depends on pre-entry prices and, thus, the threat of entry can discipline post 
103 Merger Guidelines, Section 2.0.
45
merger price increases. The entrants who stayed out under competitive, pre-merger prices might 
come in if the merged entity tries to exercise market power and raise prices.
Consider first the implications of innovation for the analysis of entry that will likely occur 
regardless of the pre-entry prices.  Merging parties often claim that entry will reduce future 
concentration and allay competitive concerns associated with their merger.  At the same time, the 
agencies often are skeptical of such claims and seek tangible evidence of the likelihood of entry.  
The fact that one or more firms have engaged in substantial research and development efforts
relevant to the product market at issue may constitute such evidence.  Investments in research 
and development, as well as in specialized plant and equipment may strongly indicate that the 
firms will shortly be entering the product market and, hence, that a merger analysis based on 
current market shares would overstate likely future concentration.  By the same token, it should 
also be noted that the lack of ongoing R&D by one or more incumbents may be an indicator that 
those suppliers are going to be of less competitive significance in the future and, thus, a merger 
analysis based on current market shares would understate likely future concentration.
Now, consider situations in which entry is contingent on pre-merger prices.  These 
situations raise subtle issues even in the absence of innovation.  When entry is contingent on the 
pre-merger behavior of the merging suppliers, the threat of entry—as opposed to actual entry—
can induce incumbents to keep their prices at pre-merger levels or at least to moderate the 
increases.  Difficult issues arise for antitrust enforcers in part because it can be harder to assess 
threats of potential entry than to measure progress toward actual entry.  
Economic analysis identifies two classes of situations in which pre-entry prices can be 
influenced by the threat of entry.  One is where the entrant takes pre-entry prices as a signal 
regarding private information that incumbents have about their costs or some other factor that 
affects their profit-maximizing prices.104  For instance, an entrant might take pre-entry prices as 
signals of the incumbents’ marginal costs, which are relevant to predicting how vigorously these 
incumbents would compete if faced with a new, competitive entrant.  In such situations, 
incumbents may set low pre-entry prices to convince potential entrants that the incumbents have 
low costs (so-called “limit pricing”).  If there is rapid technological innovation, however, current 
104 For a fully worked out theoretical analysis, see Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts (1982) “Limit Pricing and 
Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,” Econometrica 50: 443-460.
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prices may be a very poor signal of future costs and thus may have relatively little effect on a 
potential entrant’s prediction of the likely post-entry equilibrium.  Hence, the presence of rapid 
innovation tends to reduce the feasibility of limit pricing and the disciplining role of the threat of 
entry (as opposed to actual entry).
A second circumstance in which the threat of entry may affect current prices is one in 
which incumbents make investments before new entrants have come into the market, such as 
building large-capacity plants or setting low “penetration prices” to build up large installed bases 
of customers, that have the effect of both making the incumbents “tougher” post-entry rivals and 
of driving down pre-entry prices.105  In some cases, these effects will make it profitable for 
merging parties to forego large price increases even if doing so would be profitable in the short 
run.  Such pre-entry investments may include research and development expenditures.  In other 
words, the threat of entry may drive incumbents to innovate as a means of making entry less 
attractive and, once the innovations are realized, some of the benefits will typically accrue to 
consumers in the form of lower quality-adjusted prices.
Now consider product repositioning by incumbent suppliers.  Under a unilateral effects 
theory of competitive harm in a differentiated market, the concern is that the products of the two 
merging parties are each other’s close competitors and the merger will eliminate localized 
competition that would otherwise drive prices to efficient levels.106  A central issue in the 
analysis under this theory is therefore whether existing competitors would reposition their 
products to compete more closely with those of the merging parties.  For example, if two leading 
manufacturers of pick-up trucks merge, would other vehicle manufacturers expand their lines of 
pick-up trucks to compete more directly with the merged firms’ line? When there is already 
significant ongoing or potential innovation directed at a product, some of that innovation can be 
used to speed repositioning.  Of course, suppliers’ innovation capabilities may not always 
support repositioning but as a general matter it seems logical that repositioning will be easier 
when the product is already back on the proverbial drawing board for other purposes.
105 See, e.g., Dixit, Avinash K. (1979)  “A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers,” The Bell 
Journal of Economics 10: 20-32, and Spence, A. Michael (1977) “Entry, Capacity, Investment and 
Oligopolistic Pricing,” The Bell Journal of Economics 8: 534-544.
106 It is important to recognize that unilateral effects also arise in undifferentiated product markets in which 
competition is not localized.
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In addition to considering traditional entry and product repositioning issues, the further 
analysis of competitive effects may also be the stage in a trial in which “Schumpeterian” 
arguments can be addressed with the least disruption to the overall process typically followed by 
the courts.107  Recall that, under Schumpeterian rivalry, temporary monopolists successively 
displace one another through innovation and there may be little head-to-head price competition 
between the product-market-leading supplier and its rivals at any given time.  Thus, in
Schumpeterian rivalry a merger’s static pricing effects may be of little importance to consumer 
welfare and efficiency.  Under this view, the traditional concentration-competition-welfare 
presumption for static pricing would be of comparatively little relevance.  
However, the Schumpeterian dynamic does more than extend the analysis of price effects 
beyond presumptions based on market concentration. Instead, it shifts the fundamental focus of 
the analysis away from pricing altogether.  The principal competitive effects of a merger under 
Schumpeterian competition would be the effects that it has on the pace and direction of 
innovation.  Hence, that is where the analysis of competitive effects would focus, beginning with 
the weak presumptions regarding the relationship between innovation competition and 
concentration, and then moving to a further analysis of the competitive effects on innovation.
B. Further Analysis of Competitive Effects Regarding Innovation
Even more so than with price competition, it is necessary to look beyond market share data to 
understand innovation competition.  As discussed above in Section III, the theory and data that 
support the systematic presumption in favor of increased competition for purposes of static 
pricing and output efficiency have no analog when it comes to understanding the optimal 
conditions for innovation.  Despite the impossibility of making definitive general statements 
about the linkage between market structure and innovation, one can often make reasonable 
107 One might argue that Schumpeterian arguments should be addressed before or simultaneously with market 
definition because the utility of defining relevant product markets strongly depends on whether competition 
is Schumpeterian.  To oversimplify somewhat, if Schumpeterian competition is the appropriate model of 
industry behavior, then why define a relevant product market and calculate conventional market shares?  In 
the long term, it may be sensible to amend the legal process so that early on in litigation the parties address 
the issue of whether of whether Schumpeterian competition is the appropriate framework.  In the interim, 
we recommend addressing these issues after the concentration-competition-welfare presumption because we 
believe courts will be more comfortable with adopting the reform in this incremental fashion.
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predictions about the effects of specific transactions within a particular industry based on a fact-
intensive investigation. Here, we make three brief points.  
First, for reasons discussed above, it is important to understand the distribution of R&D 
assets among various actual and potential rivals.  Only then can the case-specific effects of a 
transaction on R&D even begin to be explored. 
Second, there are reasons to expect that a merger is less likely to have adverse 
coordinated effects on innovation than on price.  In markets with only a few of competitors 
(oligopolies), enforcement officials may worry firms will tacitly collude on price.108  As the 
Merger Guidelines note, such collusion on price becomes progressively harder as products and 
firms in a market become more heterogeneous and as information the firms have about each 
other becomes less complete.109 Although the underlying economic principles for understanding 
coordinated effects are the same for pricing and innovation, R&D activities have certain 
characteristics that give rise to differences in practice.  For example, R&D efforts may be more 
complex and multi-dimensional, which makes it difficult for firms tacitly to coordinate
innovation strategies.110  Similarly, the uncertain, stochastic nature of R&D output can greatly 
increase the difficulty of reaching and monitoring agreements to restrict R&D efforts.  Another
factor is the length of detection and response lags.  With process innovation it may be possible to 
keep both R&D programs and their results secret.  Thus, each supplier may fear that its rivals are 
secretly cheating on any tacit or explicit agreement to suppress innovation. Even with product 
innovation, where the results often will become visible, this may happen only with long lags after 
the initial efforts, which leaves a supplier that abides by an agreement to suppress its innovation 
efforts vulnerable to rivals that do not.
Unilateral effects on innovation, in turn, could in principle be quite strong in some 
circumstances. The typical question in unilateral effects analysis in a differentiated product 
market is whether the merged firms could act without concern that there are firms whose 
products are sufficiently close that they provide competitive discipline to the merged entities.
The primary, new issue raised by innovation is that, to the extent the focus is on determining 
108 Merger Guidelines, section 2.1.
109 Id. at section 2.11.
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whether there is localized competition, it is necessary to determine whether the localization 
occurs at the innovation or product level. For example, in a race to obtain a patent, localization 
is defined in terms of the set of firms with the particular skills and assets necessary to compete 
credibly in the R&D for the patent.  In other instances, a wide range of firms may be capable of 
innovating, but if the innovation has no market except as embodied in specific products, then the 
localization of competition of those products should be the central focus.
Our third point concerns process.  We recommend that the agencies develop and 
articulate a well-defined process or set of guidelines for analyzing the effects of mergers on 
innovation, including both a statement of presumptions and a blueprint for intensive, fact-based 
analyses of the specific situations.  In part, such guidelines would make it possible for business 
decision makers to predict whether potential mergers are likely to be approved.  A reliable basis 
for forming predictions would allow business decision makers to avoid undertaking the costly 
process of proposing deals that are later blocked.  A well-defined set of procedures would also 
improve agency decision making.  As we have discussed, mergers can have subtle and complex 
effects on innovation, and it is desirable for the agencies to bring the best thinking to bear on 
these effects, rather than rely on purely ad hoc approaches.  This paper develops a foundation and 
initial structure for a more systematic incorporation of innovation into merger review. The 
current state of understanding is such that it is impossible to draw up a more complete blueprint
in which one can have full confidence.  Consequently, there is a need for continuing innovation 
in the antitrust treatment of innovation.
C. What if the Competitive Effects for Static Pricing and Innovation Run in 
Opposite Directions?
In theory, the competitive-effects analysis of a merger could indicate that the merger would harm 
price competition but stimulate innovation.  This raises the issue of how enforcement agencies 
will determine the comparative value of those two benefits. Part of the Schumpeterian critique is 
premised on precisely this trade-off between the terms (prices and quantities) on which a good is 
sold and the nature (qualities and capabilities) of the good that is being sold. The Schumpeterian 
110 Kamien and Schwartz (1975, supra note 43, at 15), attribute this general idea to Galbraith.
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school reflexively resolves this tension in favor of the course of action that will stimulate 
improvements in the latter; in favor of innovation. But it cannot be the case that innovation will 
always be so likely or beneficial that it will outweigh harmful price effects. On the other hand, it 
cannot be true that the opposite bias that conventional merger enforcement has displayed in favor 
of price effects will always be correct either. A more careful analysis of the comparative benefits 
of price effects and innovation effects is needed. Although there are important differences, in 
many ways the issues raised by the price/innovation trade-off are similar to the issues that arise 
when weighing market power effects against cost-saving efficiencies in the conventional merger 
framework.  For that reason, we will discuss both the price/innovation and market-
power/efficiency trade-offs together in the next section.
VI. Efficiencies and Welfare Trade-Offs
If the analysis of market shares and other market characteristics demonstrates that a proposed 
merger will not give rise to a significant competitive problem, one can conclude that the merger 
will not harm competition and consumers.  But if a significant competitive problem is predicted 
by the preceding stages of analysis, then one must conduct another stage of review to predict 
correctly whether a proposed merger will benefit or harm consumers.  Simply put, a merger that 
is expected to give the merging parties the ability to raise prices profitably might nonetheless lead 
to greater social welfare and, eventually, to lower prices and/or better products over time if the 
merger gives rise to sufficient cost savings of the right sort.111  These cost savings are referred to 
as efficiencies.112 Under the Merger Guidelines’ approach, cost savings count as efficiencies if 
they are merger-specific (that is, cannot reasonably be achieved by means other than merger) and
are passed on to consumers. 113
111 For a seminal economic analysis of merger efficiencies, see Williamson, Oliver E.  1968.  “Economies as an 
antitrust defense: the welfare trade-offs.” American Economic Review 58: 18-36.
112 The Merger Guidelines describe the process as follows:
“The Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and 
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.  To 
make the requisite determination, the Agency considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely 
would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, 
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”  [Section 4, internal footnote omitted.]
113 See, Merger Guidelines, Section  4.0.
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As a general matter, it is very difficult to predict with any certainty the magnitude of cost 
savings likely to result from a proposed merger because doing so entails making predictions 
about the results of combining complex operations and corporate cultures.  Indeed, we are 
unaware of any decision in which a court has found that a merger threatened to have major
competitive harms but nonetheless allowed the merger on the grounds that it would generate 
offsetting efficiencies.  Efficiencies can, however, be of greater significance at the stage of 
agency review and can tip a “close call” on whether the Department of Justice or FTC will
challenge a merger in court in the merging parties’ favor.
Merging parties sometimes identify increased innovation capabilities as a significant 
efficiency that will result from their transaction.  Thus, it may be necessary to predict whether a 
merger will improve the combined firm’s innovation capabilities in ways that will generate 
consumer benefits.  This undertaking can be particularly difficult.  Indeed, the agencies 
themselves have expressed skepticism about innovation-based claims for a merger’s benefits and 
have asserted that “[o]ther efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are 
potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of 
anticompetitive output reductions.”114 In other words, there is a danger that the “savings” in 
R&D expenditures merely represent a reduction in competitive activities aimed at innovation.  
Although the Schumpeterian school may too readily privilege innovation over price effects, the 
passage above suggests the Merger Guidelines may too readily discount innovation in favor of 
higher output, lower prices, and short-run efficiency.
A. Potential Sources of Efficiencies
A first step toward righting the balance between static and dynamic benefits in the welfare 
analysis of mergers is to see how a merger might lower the costs of R&D or in other ways 
increase merging firms’ abilities to innovate successfully.  There are at least three types of effect 
that merging parties might assert would occur: (1) increased capabilities realized by combining 
complementary assets; (2) larger firm size, which somehow gives rise to a greater ability to 
114 Merger Guidelines, Section 4.
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absorb the risks of or fund R&D; or (3) less competition and greater product-market profits, 
which can then fund R&D. We address these effects in order.
With respect to combining complementary assets, a fundamental issue is whether an 
alternative means (e.g., licensing of complementary intellectual property) can achieve the same 
efficiencies without removing a competitor.  Mergers have specific institutional features that may 
give rise to certain advantages in facilitating the exchange of complementary assets. For 
example, Professor Oliver Williamson has shown that under some conditions, merged ownership 
may reduce transaction costs of exchanging goods and services compared to less integrated forms 
of governance like contracts or joint ventures.115 Available research shows, however, that the 
issue needs careful attention on a case-by-case basis.116
Turning to the second type of effect, considerable debate surrounds the relevance of firm 
size for innovation.117 Following Schumpeter, some observers have praised large enterprises for
their superior ability to attract financial and human capital, bear the risk, and recoup the 
investment required for sustained R&D activities.118   Other analysts tout small firms as being 
more creative than larger, more bureaucratic enterprises.119  Many empirical studies have 
addressed the relationship between firm size and innovation.  Most recent research yields a 
consensus that, in general, R&D rises only proportionally, and only up to a point, with firm 
size.120  The strength of the causal relationship between firm size and R&D, however, remains
somewhat questionable despite the observed correlations.  Because many variables correlate with 
115 Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (1975).
116 For a general comparison of alternative institutional arrangements, including merger, see Katz, Michael L.
(1995) “Joint Ventures as a Means of Assembling Complementary Inputs,” Group Decision and 
Negotiation 4: 383-400.  For a survey of empirical research testing transaction-cost hypotheses see 
Shelanski, Howard A. and Peter G. Klein (1995) “Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A 
Review and Assessment,” J. L. Econ. & Org. 11: 335-361.
117 For an overview of the ambiguous relationship between firm size and innovation, see Cohen, Wesley M., 
and Steven Klepper (1996) “A Reprise of Firm Size and R&D,” The Economic Journal 106: 925-51.
118 Galbraith, John Kenneth (1952) American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, and Nordhaus, William D. (1969) Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical 
Treatment of Technological Change, Cambridge: MIT Press.
119 Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz (1982) Market Structure and Innovation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, and Cohen and Levin (1989, supra note ___, at 1067).
120 Scherer, Frederick M. (1965) “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented 
Inventions,” American Economic Review 55: 1097-1125.
53
firm size, it is unclear in many studies whether firm size itself is a statistically significant factor 
in innovation.  Although early studies did purport to find significance,121 others have found that, 
when other firm and industry characteristics are factored in, firm size does not significantly affect 
R&D investment.122  When the focus of analysis shifts from innovation inputs such as R&D 
expenditures to outputs such as patents, large firms show no advantage over small ones.123  Data 
matching R&D investment with patent output have in fact shown that smaller firms produce 
more innovations per R&D dollar and per employee than do large firms.124
The evidence overall thus suggests that, to the extent firm size has an effect on 
innovation, its magnitude and direction depend on associated industry-level variables and are 
susceptible to few general presumptions.  The results suggest that especially large firms have no 
special tendency—nor any predictable reluctance—to engage in innovation, and that small, fringe 
firms may play important roles over time in technologically advancing markets.125
Lastly, consider the argument that greater product-market profits make it possible for 
firms to conduct additional R&D.  The profits-innovation linkage has two interpretations.  One is 
that the potential for product-market profits generates innovation incentives.  This interpretation 
concerns competitive effects and was addressed earlier in Section III where we discussed the 
complex link between market structure and innovation. The other interpretation is that current 
profits can generate free cash-flow to finance R&D efforts.  Because this interpretation is loosely 
a statement about the production of innovation, rather than incentives, we will treat it here as an
efficiency-based claim.  A first observation is that a remarkable and dangerous lack of a limiting 
121 Cohen and Levin (1989), supra note ___.
122 Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987), supra note ___, and Cohen and Levin (1989), supra note ___.
123 Fisher, Franklin, and Peter Temin (1973) “Returns to Scale in Research and Development: What Does the 
Schumpeterian Hypotheses Imply?” Journal of Political Economy 81: 56-70, Kohn, M.T., and J.T. Scott
(1982) “Scale Economies in Research and Development: The Schumpeterian Hypothesis,” Journal of 
Industrial Economics 30: 239-49, Acs, Zoltan, and David Audretsch (1990) Innovation and Small Firms,
Cambridge: MIT Press, and Acs, Zoltan, and David Audretsch (1991) “R&D, Firm Size, and Innovative 
Activity,” in Innovation and Technological Change: an International Comparison, Acs and Audretsch 
(eds.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
124 Acs and Audretsch (1991), supra note 123.
125 See, e.g., Baker, Jonathan B. (1995) “Fringe Firms and incentives to Innovate.” Antitrust Law Journal 63: 
621-41.
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principle exists in this argument.  By this argument, for example, why not grant a firm a 
monopoly in a completely unrelated market to generate the cash flow needed to conduct R&D in 
the market of concern?  Second, given the overall efficiency of U.S. capital markets, this 
argument is inherently suspect.  It is not surprising that, in their review of the empirical literature 
some years ago, Kamien and Schwartz found that "[i]n sum, the empirical evidence that either 
liquidity or profitability are conducive to innovative effort or output appears slim."126
Thus, neither the evidence on firm size nor that on profitability supports any presumption 
that mergers will enhance R&D investment or make that investment more productive.
Assessments of efficiency benefits for innovation will therefore likely turn on the analysis of 
whether the merger under consideration allows the combination of complementary assets that 
would not otherwise be combined through a means posing less of a threat to competition. We 
now return to this question in greater detail
B. Merger Specificity
If a simple, arms-length transaction would allow the parties to reap the cost savings in some way 
that would not raise competitive concerns, then those cost savings do not justify the merger.  As 
should be readily apparent, it can often be extremely difficult to assess whether a practical 
alternative (e.g., a research joint venture under which competing suppliers jointly invest in 
innovation and share the results among themselves) exists for realizing the cost savings.  
Complex issues arise because, in theory, two firms might be able to separate cooperation 
regarding product-market activities from cooperation with respect to R&D activities.  Thus, in 
some cases an important element of merger analysis is to determine whether the parties need a 
merger rather than a research joint venture or some other form of research cooperation that 
creates innovation benefits without sacrificing product-market competition.
A first step of the analysis is therefore to ask whether the parties offer a credible argument 
that they need to cooperate to increase or improve R&D.  As part of this analysis, enforcement 
authorities will want to ask why the parties need to cooperate; is it, for example, to gain the 
benefit of complementary assets, to reduce costly duplication, or to reduce the risk of failing to 
126 Kamien and Schwartz (1975, supra note 43, at 26).
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appropriate the benefits of R&D? Once the merging parties establish the basis for cooperative 
R&D, the next step is to examine whether the parties can get those asserted R&D benefits 
through an institution like a joint venture or licensing contract that would still preserve 
competition between the parties in the product market.  If so, then society would then have the 
benefits of cooperation without the social costs of reduced product market competition and its 
associated inefficiencies.
The evidence shows that the second step above—finding less restrictive alternatives to 
full merger for cooperative innovation—will sometimes be feasible and sometimes not. On one 
hand, the value of R&D joint ventures is sufficiently great that Congress in 1984 passed the 
National Cooperative Research Act, amended in 1993 and re-titled the National Cooperative 
Research and Production Act (NCRPA), designed to encourage and protect such ventures by 
reducing their potential exposure to antitrust liability.127 Although it is unclear how effective the 
NCRPA has been, the motivation behind the statute appears to have been sound. For example, a
detailed study of semiconductor R&D found that firms in that industry achieve valuable 
innovation efficiencies through joint ventures that are comparable to the benefits that would be 
achieved though mergers but without the product market inefficiencies mergers can create.128
Encouraging joint ventures over alternative mechanisms for collaborative R&D would likely be 
beneficial in that particular industry. 
On the other hand, there is evidence joint ventures will not always suffice. Sometimes 
governance of the comparatively arms-length transactions of a joint venture may be more costly 
than where a single owner can intervene to set the terms of collaboration.129  In a different vein, 
firms may be hesitant to enter into joint ventures with firms they perceive to have a competitive 
edge in the use and production of the innovations the joint venture develops, thus making the 
firms unwilling to put their complementary assets into the mix without a more complete and 
permanent fusion of the enterprises.  The upshot is that the evidence and studies on the value of 
127 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05
128 Gugler, Klaus, and Ralph Siebert (2004) “Market Power versus Efficiency Effects of Mergers and Research 
Joint Ventures: Evidence form the Seminconductor Industry,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 10323.
129 Howard A. Shelanski, “Transaction-Level Determinants of Transfer-Pricing Policy: Evidence from the 
High-Technology Sector,” 13 Indust. & Corp. Change 953 (2004).
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joint ventures do not counsel blocking R&D-motivated mergers but they do show that there will 
sometimes be a serious question about the merger specificity of innovation-based efficiencies.
C. Tensions between Efficiency and Consumer Welfare
Consideration of efficiencies in merger review typically brings to the fore the difference between 
a consumer-welfare standard and an economic-efficiency, or total-surplus, standard.  Under a
pure consumer-welfare standard, cost savings are relevant only to the extent that they are passed 
on to consumers in the form of lower prices or better products.  Thus, a consumer-welfare 
standard would not count as benefits any projected savings in corporate overhead that are 
predicted to have no effect on product prices.  Nonetheless, such savings would represent real 
gains to the economy, and they would be counted as benefits under a total-surplus standard.   
The analysis of efficiencies from a static pricing perspective often focuses solely on 
variable costs, on the grounds that changes in fixed costs will not affect the calculation of profit-
maximizing prices.  However, a change in the fixed costs of innovation may trigger a change in 
the resulting level of innovation (i.e., whether a project is undertaken or not), which then has 
consequences for consumer welfare.  Consequently, it is important that fixed costs not be 
summarily excluded from the efficiencies analysis when innovation is at issue. Another way of 
describing this point is to state that it is important to remember that, over a long enough time 
horizon, everything is variable.  This fact suggests that the tension between the consumer-surplus 
and total-surplus standards is somewhat attenuated when one takes a long-run view; consumers 
also have a strong long-run interest in firms’ having incentives to invest in innovation, as well as 
production and distribution, in order to supply goods and services that consumers desire.
The tensions between the welfare concepts do not disappear completely, however.  For 
example, under an efficiency standard, one would take into account the fact that a merger might 
eliminate socially wasteful duplication of R&D, even if doing so did not speed up the date at 
which innovation occurred or reduce quality-adjusted product prices.  Indeed, an economic-
efficiency standard would in some circumstances count as a benefit the fact that a merger slowed 
the rate of innovation from a socially excessive level, although a consumer-surplus standard 
might find the merger harmful because new products reach customers later than they otherwise 
would.  Under a consumer-welfare standard the cost savings from any reduction in innovation 
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would count as benefits only if passed through to consumers as lower prices, similar to the 
criterion for weighing productive efficiencies in the conventional merger-review framework.  But 
in the conventional, static-efficiencies situation, the consumer ideally gets the same product at a 
lower price post-merger (or at the same price, where the efficiencies offset adverse competitive 
effects).  In contrast, when a merger reduces inefficient innovation, the consumer at best gets a 
different (less advanced) product at a lower post-merger price and the price reduction may not 
compensate for the difference in product characteristics.  
Indeed, there is a broader problem.  As discussed next, there may not be a tight 
correspondence between the magnitude of the R&D investment and the magnitude of the 
resulting consumer-welfare benefit.  If merger policy continues to increase its focus on 
innovation, it may therefore have to deal with welfare trade-offs that antitrust does not confront 
in conventional product-market competition cases.  To do that it will need to adopt a more 
rigorous framework for judging a merger’s predicted effects.
D. Assessing Consumer Welfare Over Time and Under Uncertainty 
Efficiencies are typically difficult to project with any confidence, even when innovation is not an 
issue.  For several reasons, innovation makes the task even more difficult.  First, there is a large 
element of uncertainty in innovation, and R&D projects often have extremely long gestation 
periods.  Second, as discussed above, economists, policy makers, and business decision makers 
only imperfectly understand the drivers of innovation.  Third, where efficiency leads to greater 
product innovation and consumers have heterogeneous valuations of quality, projecting net 
consumer benefits can be complex.  Finally, to the extent that innovation involves discrete 
projects and fixed-cost commitments, even a small change in fixed costs can lead to a large 
change in consumer welfare.  This relationship holds when the cost change (or other merger 
efficiency) tips the balance in favor of a supplier’s undertaking a discrete investment that 
generates a large amount of consumer surplus, such as the introduction of a new product.  In 
principle, the consumer surplus generated by these new services made possible by an R&D 
investment can exceed the merger-specific reduction in the costs of conducting the R&D. Thus, 
the agencies have to be careful not to measure the efficiency benefits of R&D cost savings purely 
in terms of the cost savings themselves. Innovation can potentially multiply these benefits.
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The extent of uncertainty makes the assessment of efficiencies difficult, and the general 
lack of sophistication in the treatment of uncertainty in litigation makes the problem worse.
Moreover, uncertainty arises from several other aspects of merger analysis, such as predicting 
competitor responses to the merger. In the innovation context, the treatment of uncertainty 
becomes even more critical because systematic presumptions about the effects of market 
concentration on innovation are at least elusive and more likely impossible.  Both in 
conventional cases and in cases where innovation is an important consideration, merger review 
will have to do a good job of accounting for the effects of uncertain events to ensure its 
predictions and presumptions are welfare enhancing. 
The current approach to merger enforcement unfortunately does not make explicit the 
process by which the agencies weigh and consider the several variables—price effects, 
efficiencies, innovation benefits, competitive entry—that the Guidelines factor into predictions 
about a merger’s effects and whose values are uncertain.  This central shortcoming of merger 
enforcement is magnified when innovation is involved. To make the issue more concrete, 
consider a merger that would likely increase market power by a modest amount but would, with 
less certainty, allow for substantial production efficiencies that make price decreases profitable 
for the merged entity. What weight does the less-than-likely efficiency receive in the agency’s 
overall assessment of the merger?  Zero?  Its magnitude discounted by its probability—i.e., its 
expected value?  Something in between?  The agencies and courts have not been clear or 
consistent in articulating how different potential effects factor into merger analysis, nor have they 
adopted a systematic way to account for uncertainty.  
In its 1996 report, “Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace” 
(“1996 FTC Report”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) came out squarely in favor of 
taking into account both the magnitudes and probabilities of potential, merger-related 
efficiencies.  That position appears consistent with an expected value approach and contrary to an 
approach that would drop efficiencies from consideration based on a low probability alone.  Yet 
the 1996 FTC Report never expressly states how the agency should use the probabilities and 
magnitudes of efficiencies in analyzing a given merger.
For their part, the federal courts have often relied on the Merger Guidelines to hold 
merging parties to a standard of “clear and convincing” proof that a merger would produce pro-
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consumer efficiencies.130  Such a stringent evidentiary standard has the practical effect of 
imposing a probability threshold on efficiencies that has to be cleared before a court will take 
them into account: if proven to a “clear and convincing” likelihood, then the efficiencies get 
counted (although to what extent is not clear from the cases or agency practice), and if the 
evidence falls short of proving that level of likelihood, then the efficiencies are rejected and 
receive no weight at all.
The continuing applicability of the “clear and convincing” threshold has been open to 
question since 1997, when the FTC and Department of Justice revised the Merger Guidelines to 
recognize more formally that “mergers may generate efficiencies, which may benefit consumers 
and the economy.”131  The Department of Justice has continued since 1997 to advocate a 
stringent standard of proof for efficiencies before the courts, suggesting that the agencies may 
still, at least implicitly, impose probability thresholds in their internal decision making.132  In 
recent years, however, some courts have rejected the “clear and convincing” language.  The 
district court in FTC v. Staples stated that such a standard would impose on defendants “the 
nearly impossible task of rebutting a possibility with a certainty.”133  The court’s statement 
accords not just with common sense, but with decision theory as well.  In contrast, the 
Department of Justice’s position would require that efficiencies be proved to a very high level of 
probability before they could be balanced against anticompetitive merger effects, even if the 
anticompetitive effects had no greater a likelihood of occurring or had a smaller expected value.  
In place of the clear-and-convincing standard, the Staples court applied a “credible evidence” 
standard: “defendants must simply rebut the presumption that the merger will substantially lessen 
competition by showing that the [FTC’s] evidence gives an inaccurate prediction of the proposed 
acquisition’s probable effect.  Defendants, however, must do this with credible evidence.”134
130 See, e.g., U.S. v. Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 n.13 (D. Minn. 1990); U.S. v. Rockford 
Memorial Corp., 717 F.Supp. 1251, 1289 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
131 Release, “FTC/DOJ Announce Revised Guidelines on Efficiencies in Mergers,” 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/04/effpress.htm (quoting FTC Chair Robert Pitofsky).
132 See David Balto, “The Efficiency Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation,” Antitrust ABA
16:74-81, n.39 and accompanying text (2001).
133 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (D.D.C. 1997).
134 Ibid.
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In a subsequent case, FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals characterized the 
necessary level of proof as that necessary “to ensure that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than 
mere speculation and promises about post-merger behavior.”135  But even though the Heinz
decision did not require that the efficiencies evidence be “clear and convincing,” it did require 
that the efficiencies themselves be of “extraordinary” dimension.136  If proponents of a 
transaction could not prove the merger-specific efficiencies to be “substantial”, the court ruled, 
then the efficiencies could not rebut the presumption of harm where the merger would result in a 
high level of concentration.137  It is unclear from Heinz whether the court was saying that lower 
(i.e., below “extraordinary”) levels of merger-specific efficiency gains could not as a matter of 
law be used to rebut an anticompetitive presumption or that lower levels of efficiency would not 
as a matter of fact offset the competitive harms from high concentration.  Either interpretation is 
problematic for effective merger review.  If modest efficiencies will be achieved with a high 
probability, why should they be barred from consideration?  In many cases, they may fail to 
offset the presumption of harm.  But in cases where the probability of harm is moderate and the 
level of that harm low, even modest efficiencies could make the merger welfare-enhancing.  
Consequently, there seems to be no good reason to bar such efficiencies from consideration. 
Given the history of agency skepticism about efficiencies and the hard time parties have 
had getting efficiency evidence credited by the courts, the murky standards raise the prospect that 
merger enforcement is driven by likely outcomes to the exclusion of unlikely outcomes, even if 
the less likely outcomes would have major impacts if they did occur. Such a focus on 
probabilities to the exclusion of magnitudes leads a merger to be challenged and possibly 
blocked if it is found likely to give rise to consumer harm even if, for example, there were a 60 
percent chance that consumers would suffer $100 million in harm and a 40 percent chance that 
consumers would reap $200 million in benefit.  In effect, the probability-oriented approach acts 
135 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
136 Ibid. at 720.
137 Ibid.
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as if consumers are extremely risk averse, even for products that account for a small percentage 
of consumer expenditures.138
We think that agencies and courts can improve merger analysis in the presence of 
uncertainty by applying the well accepted body of economic decision theory that addresses how 
to make choices under uncertain conditions.  Deciding whether to clear or block a merger 
involves uncertainty about the prospective costs and benefits of the transaction.  A decision-
theoretic approach to choice under uncertainty can be formalized as picking the course of action 
that yields the highest expected payoff to the decision maker, where the expected value of taking 
an action is equal to the payoffs associated with the different possible outcomes that can follow 
from that action weighted by the probabilities that those outcomes will occur if the action is 
taken. Rational decision-making under this approach requires an understanding of: the set of 
outcomes that can potentially follow from alternative courses of action; the probabilities that the 
different outcomes will arise conditional on the course of action taken; and the payoffs associated 
with the different potential outcomes.
Consider a simple hypothetical, in which there are four possible outcomes: (a) a 
significant increase in market power with no efficiencies; (b) a significant increase in market 
power with efficiencies; (c) an insignificant increase in market power with no efficiencies; and 
(d) an insignificant increase in market power with efficiencies.139 Suppose that the chances of 
the different outcomes arising are 36 percent for outcome (a), 24 percent for (b), 24 percent for 
(c), and 16 percent for (d). Finally, suppose that the respective payoffs for the different outcomes 
are: (a) 80 million; (b) 80 million; (c) 1 million; and (d) 160 million.
Under the probability threshold approach, efficiencies would very likely be dismissed 
because they arise only under (b) and (d), which have a combined likelihood of 40 percent.  
However, significant increase in market power is more likely than not because outcomes (a) and 
(b) arise with a combined probability of 60 percent.  Thus, the threshold approach would very 
likely reject the merger.  In contrast, the decision-theoretic approach indicates that the antitrust 
138 Moreover, as discussed below, it is well known that a consumer who is risk neutral with respect to income 
will be risk loving with respect to prices.
139 In our example, either there are no efficiencies or efficiencies are fully realized.  In practice, there may be 
several different levels of efficiencies that might be attained with positive probability.  The expected-payoff 
readily generalizes to any number of possibilities. 
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authorities should approve the merger in order to promote consumer welfare.  Specifically, the 
expected payoff from the merger measured in millions is found by multiplying each outcome’s 
probability by the outcome’s payoff and then taking the sum of those four products:
76.1516.16024.124.8036.80 =×+××+×  .
It is useful to describe this approach more formally to allow generalization.  Let 
},...,,{ 21 nXXX denote the set of possible outcomes, such as different prices that might arise if a 
merger were consummated.  Let i denote the probability that outcome iX  will arise if the 
merger is approved.  Note that the values of },...,,{ 21 n are derived from the agencies and 
courts’ analysis of the observable market conditions.  Finally, let )( iXu denote the payoff 
associated with outcome iX .  Then, by definition, the expected payoff associated with allowing 
the merger is:

i
iiXu )( . 
If one measures payoffs so that the baseline of blocking the merger gives rise to an 
expected payoff of zero, then the decision-theoretic approach will call for the merger to be 
blocked if the expected payoff from the merger is negative and approved if the expected payoff is 
positive.
The fundamental point for policy is that the magnitude of each possible outcome (i.e., the 
size of )( iXu ) and not just whether it is likely (i.e., whether i  is above some threshold) must 
be taken into account if the welfare implications of a merger are to be fully understood.  
Arbitrary thresholds for probabilities could rule out consideration of events with major 
implications for consumers and that, in the repeated exercise of merger review, could add up to 
major welfare costs across transactions.
It is important to observe that the use of a payoff function gives this approach a high 
degree of flexibility.  The payoff function gives a score to each possible outcome, and that score 
can capture a variety of different factors.  One is the decision maker’s attitude toward risk.  
Suppose that iX is the realized value of consumer surplus under outcome i.  If the antitrust 
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enforcer’s objective is to maximize consumer welfare and the enforcer is risk neutral, then the 
enforcer will seek to maximize the expected value of iX , which is 
i
iiX  .
Enforcers may, however, be averse to variations in consumer welfare.  That is, faced with 
two actions that have the same expected level of consumer surplus, the enforcer may prefer the 
one that involves less uncertainty about the resulting level.  In fact, enforcers with this aversion 
to risk might be willing to accept a lower expected level of consumer surplus in return for less 
variability in the realized level of consumer surplus.  Enforcers’ risk aversion can be captured by 
a payoff function that tends to fall faster in response to losses than it rises from gains (a so-called 
concave function).140
Suppose that allowing a merger gives rise to a ½ chance that consumers will gain $100 
million in surplus and a ½ chance that they will lose $100 million in surplus.  The expected value 
of the merger’s effects on consumer welfare is zero.  Suppose, however, the difference between 
)0(u and )000,000,100(u is less than the difference between )000,000,100(u and )0(u .  Then 
the expected payoff associated with allowing the merger, )000,000,100()000,000,100( 2121 uu +
will be less than the expected payoff associated with blocking it, )0(u .141
A decision-theoretic approach does not dictate policy preferences regarding how much, 
and what kinds, of risk to accept in making enforcement decisions. If policy makers decide, for 
example, that it is important to avoid the risk of impeding the efficiency of domestic firms in a 
globally competitive market, they can factor a discount on price effects or a premium on cost-
saving effects into the payoff function of their expected-value framework; they can do the 
opposite if the market is one in which there is aversion to risk of short-run price increases.  
Similarly, if—as a policy choice—only efficiencies that get passed through to consumers are to 
be counted in favor of a merger, the probability and magnitude of pass-through can be variables 
that factor into the decision analysis.  The expected-welfare, decision-theoretic approach is 
140 David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (1990) at 82-83.
141 For a more detailed and complete discussion of uncertainty analysis in merger review, see Michael L. Katz 
and Howard A. Shelanski, “Merger Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should we Expect Better?” 
forthcoming in W. Dale Collins (ed.) ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (2006).
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beneficial because it requires that any policy preferences be made explicit; increasing (one hopes) 
the likelihood that those choices will be well thought out. 
The fact that both competitive harms and merger benefits accrue over time also 
challenges the current approach to merger analysis.  Here, too, the agencies often adopt a 
threshold approach; the agencies are particularly likely to be dismissive of events that they do not 
project to take place in the very near future.  For example, the Merger Guidelines tend to 
consider entry only within a limited time horizon.142  Thus, similar to the treatment of 
uncertainty, the treatment of inter-temporal weights is often rather unsophisticated. Indeed, the 
two problems are linked.  Partly in response to concerns that the future is highly uncertain, the 
antitrust agencies tend to take a relatively short-run perspective. For instance, the Merger 
Guidelines state that efficiency benefits that are predicted to be realized only with a lag are 
“given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”143
In terms of meaningfully projecting effects on consumers’ economic welfare, however, it 
makes little sense to put almost no weight on the future.  Entry four years in the future has less 
value than entry one year in the future, but it does not have zero value.  Arbitrarily cutting off 
from consideration entry that occurs more than two years hence, as the Merger Guidelines often 
do, truncates the proper welfare analysis.  The lesson from decision theory is to factor in 
magnitudes in addition to probabilities and to discount those magnitudes over the relevant time 
periods.
In this regard, it should be observed that, for at least two reasons, simply using a higher 
discount factor to deal with uncertainty is likely to be a very poor heuristic. First, it is not the 
case that events farther in the future are always less certain.  Second, even where events do 
become less certain over time, there is no reason to believe that the expected values will always 
fall proportionately with time or the degree of uncertainty, as the following example illustrates.  
Consider a project that lowers costs by 20 percent with probability p, by 0 percent also with 
probability p, and by 10 percent with probability 1  2p.  Higher values of p correspond to greater 
142 Specifically, for non-durable goods the agencies tend to look only two years forward, although the Merger 
Guidelines provide no rationale for this cutoff.  (Merger Guidelines, § 3.2.)  In our experience, the agencies 
sometimes take a more sophisticated view, at least when deciding whether to file a case against a proposed 
merger, if not in court.
143 Ibid, footnote 37.
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uncertainty (there is a greater chance that one of the extreme values of 0 percent or 20 percent is 
realized), but the expected size of the cost reduction remains constant at 10 percent.  If the 
decision maker is risk neutral with respect to the cost reductions or to consumer welfare, then it 
makes no sense to discount the cost reduction as a means of handling uncertainty.144  Doing so, 
in effect, throws out much of the information about the nature of the uncertainty and the shape of 
the probability distribution over possible outcomes.
Issues of inter-temporal trade-offs under uncertainty also arise when a merger’s projected 
competitive effects on static pricing and innovation run in opposite directions.  In terms of 
consumer welfare effects, antitrust enforcers may face an uncertain trade-off between higher 
prices in the short run and lower (quality-adjusted) prices in the long run.  In such situations, it 
would be particularly valuable for the agencies and the courts to make greater use of the standard 
tools of decision theory (e.g., developing subjective probability distributions for critical 
parameters and utilizing decision tress to calculate expected values) to make rational calculations 
of the expected net present value of benefits or harms.
VII. Remedies and Post-Merger Considerations
Several public policy responses are available if analysis indicates that the net effect of a merger 
in its proposed form may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
These steps include blocking the transaction outright, forcing the divestiture of assets where 
competitive overlaps are particularly significant, requiring licensing of intellectual property to 
other firms to allow them to compete more effectively with the merging parties, and limiting the 
merged firm’s conduct (e.g., imposing a requirement to offer the same prices to all customers to 
prevent the merged firm from targeting customers whose only practical options were the two 
merging suppliers).
144 Indeed, because consumer welfare tends to be convex in prices, decision makes who were risk neutral with 
respect to consumer welfare would be risk loving with respect to price reductions.
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A. The Role of Intellectual Property in Remedies for Traditional Concerns
When intellectual property rights are sufficiently strong that licensing is feasible, it can be used 
in fashioning a remedy to a proposed merger that raises significant concerns of harm to static 
price and output competition. Licensing remedies have become an important tool in the review 
and clearance of mergers in markets with considerable past innovation and significant intellectual 
property assets.  For example, in 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint 
challenging the proposed acquisition of DTM Corporation (DTM) by 3D Systems Corporation 
(3D).145  The firms competed in the sale of rapid prototyping (RP) systems, which transform a 
digitally encoded design into a three-dimensional object.  The process can be used to produce 
models and even low-volume production quantities by what might be loosely thought of as three-
dimensional laser printing.
Both 3D and DTM held extensive patent portfolios related to RP systems production that 
prevented firms that sold RP systems abroad from competing in the United States.  As discussed 
below in Section VIII, the Department of Justice was concerned that the merger would 
significantly reduce competition.  The Department of Justice and the parties reached a settlement 
that required 3D and DTM to grant a nonexclusive license to manufacture and sell products 
under the defendants' RP patent portfolios within specific fields of use.146  The idea was to allow 
a foreign supplier to enter the U.S. market as a replacement for the loss of an independent 
competitor through merger.  The licensee was required to be a firm currently manufacturing 
industrial RP systems in a foreign market, so that it would have a demonstrated ability to 
compete.147
As a general matter, there are two antitrust rationales for compulsory licensing: (1) to 
remedy a refusal to license that itself is held to be exclusionary and to constitute an antitrust 
violation, and (2) to ameliorate the effects of another action that is illegal or—absent licensing—
145 United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp., (CCH) ¶ 73,738 (D.D.C. 2002) Verified Complaint.
146 United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp., (CCH) ¶ 73,738 (D.D.C. 2002) Final Judgment 
Proposed).
147 Intellectual property assets also were included in the divestitures required to settle United States v. Premdor 
U.S. Holdings, Inc. International Paper Company, and Masonite Corporation.  Similarly, United States v 
Miller Industries involved acquisitions of tow truck companies holding important patents and led to a 
connsent degree with mandatory licensing.
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would be prohibited under the antitrust laws.  Licensing as a remedy in a merger case falls into 
this second category.
It is useful to distinguish between a duty to deal with competitors and licensing as a 
remedy because they may have very different effects on incentives to innovate.  A general duty to 
deal under antitrust law weakens intellectual property rights and may create disincentives to 
engage in certain innovative efforts.  It essentially tells firms they will have to share the results of 
their R&D investments with rivals who have shared none of the risks of that investment.  In 
contrast, compulsory licensing as a remedy that allows a merger to go through may not weaken 
innovation incentives and theoretically could even increase them.  For example, suppose that the 
licensing allows a merger to be completed that would otherwise be blocked.  To the extent that 
licensing is a means of restoring competition that is less costly to the defendant than are 
alternatives (e.g., dissolving the merger), the defendant benefits from having created intellectual 
property that can be incorporated into a remedy.  Although it is far from evident that these 
positive effects on R&D incentives are significant, the argument does at least suggest that any 
negative incentive effects from licensing remedies may be insignificant.
B. Remedies for Innovation Concerns
Merger remedies can involve the divestiture or licensing of assets, including intellectual property, 
specifically to maintain innovation competition and not just price competition.  The challenge for 
merger policy in crafting remedies for cases in which innovation is a central concern is to 
identify the right assets for divestiture or, where those assets are intellectual property, for 
licensing.  In the case where, for example, two drugstore chains seek to merge, divestiture is 
relatively straightforward in principle: the parties must divest stores where the pre-merger firms 
have overlapping territories. To be sure, assuring that those stores are divested in a way that 
maintains their competitive viability against the merged entity may present challenges, but 
identifying which stores to divest tends to be easy.
The problem tends to be much harder when the assets to be divested are intended to 
maintain competition in innovation, particularly when those assets are human capital.  It can be 
difficult to determine which personnel are central to an innovation effort and where in the 
company they are located.  And, although a firm can be ordered to sell some or all of a research 
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unit, employees cannot be required to remain with that unit.148  Beyond human capital issues, 
there may be questions regarding whether R&D is conducted in a way that it is severable for 
purposes of divestiture.  Identifying the intellectual property rights that would be needed in order 
to make use of future innovation also can be very difficult.  These problems are not necessarily 
insurmountable, but they do highlight some of the challenges that innovation creates for remedial 
merger policy. As the cases in the Section VIII demonstrate, enforcement agencies have been 
slowly grappling with issues of innovation-oriented remedies in merger cases over the past 
decade.
C. Post-Merger Considerations
Innovation considerations may also affect antitrust policy toward a merged entity after an 
acquisition is consummated.  If a merger turns out to have anticompetitive effects, it is at least 
theoretically possible to “unscramble the eggs” and order the newly formed enterprise to break 
itself into its previous components or to divide along some other basis that would restore 
competition.  Such divestiture is easier when the harm to competition stems from consolidation 
of physical assets that can be sold off cleanly.  For the reasons discussed above, post-merger 
divestiture is potentially a much messier prospect when the harm stems from consolidation of
R&D assets in the form of human capital, and the end result of a forced divestiture might be to 
weaken the merged entity without restoring competition.
A detailed analysis of how innovation affects application of antitrust laws generally is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  But a brief discussion of the role antitrust might play in the post-
merger environment demonstrates that the complexity innovation may introduce into the 
possibilities for later antitrust scrutiny of the merged firm lends particular importance to getting 
the merger review right in the first place.  In particular, there are several difficult challenges that 
may arise in determining when and how the antimonopoly provisions of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act should apply to innovative firms.149 Suppose a merged entity turns out to become 
148 In this regard, the divestiture of intellectual property to preserve product-market competition is more similar 
to the manufacturing/retailing paradigm than to the innovation paradigm.
149 For a discussion of the application of Section 2 to high-technology markets, see Evans and Schmalensee, 
supra note ___.
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dominant.  Separating the degree to which the dominance flows from beneficial innovation or 
from anticompetitive actions can be difficult.150  Even defining a violation can be particularly 
difficult. Is integration of increasingly advanced functions into a product efficient innovation or 
anticompetitive tying or bundling?  And once a violation is proven, it can be especially difficult 
to design a remedy in fast-moving environments of technological change.  Antitrust authorities 
will face the challenge of crafting remedies that constrain anticompetitive behavior without 
reducing innovation or network benefits that may have accrued to consumers.
VIII. Innovation Cases
The U.S. antitrust agencies have by now reviewed several mergers in which innovation was an 
important consideration. A review of those cases helps one to understand how far the agencies 
have been willing to incorporate innovation concerns into merger policy and also to assess the 
kinds of cases in which the agencies have been, or can be, successful in that enterprise.
Before examining actual cases, we lay out three canonical situations to frame some of the 
recurring issues. These situations illustrate both the different ways in which innovation can factor 
into merger policy and how those innovation related inquiries differ from the traditional inquiry 
focused on short-term price and output effects. The first two cases represent the opposite ends of 
a continuum that begins with conventional considerations of actual or potential competition in 
product markets, where innovation serves as supporting evidence, and runs all the way to cases in 
which innovation is the sole or central concern of the merger analysis.  The third case illustrates 
that situations can exist in the middle where there potentially are significant trade-offs between 
static and dynamic competition or there is a need to evaluate alternative institutions in terms of 
both types of efficiency considerations simultaneously.
A. Cannonical Situations
The concept of innovation can span a spectrum of activities ranging from pure research aimed at 
making discoveries in basic science to developmental activities that apply known inventions and 
150 Much of the public debate surrounding the Department of Justice’s pursuit of Microsoft, for example, 
involved precisely that question.
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scientific results to the improvement of existing products or production processes.  The closer the 
innovation at issue in a particular merger is to resulting in an identifiable, predictable product, 
the more likely the issue for merger review will be how the innovation will affect future structure 
and performance in the product market relevant to the transaction (i.e., the innovation impact 
effect).  The farther the innovation is from a tangible result, the more likely the question for 
merger authorities will be how the transaction will affect the likelihood and level of continued 
investment in R&D (i.e., the innovation incentives effect).  To illustrate how the question for 
merger policy changes as the nature of the innovation changes along the continuum from pure 
research to market production, we next discuss three abstract cases showing the different 
problems that different forms of innovation present for merger review.
Case 1: Innovation that is well underway to create or improve defined products and 
processes.  We begin by considering situations in which the innovation efforts of the merging 
parties and their rivals are largely complete.151  In some cases, the firms may already be product-
market competitors, with ongoing R&D efforts aimed at improving existing products and 
processes.  In other cases, the firms seeking to merge may not yet be competitors in any product 
market, but these firms may be developing products that will enable the firms to compete with 
one another in one or more product markets in the future.
In the settings just described, the potential harms from a merger arise not so much from 
the elimination of competing R&D as from the elimination of future product-market competition 
between the merging parties.  Hence, the focus of merger analysis is the conventional one of 
product-market competition rather than anything specially to do with innovation.  However, the 
presence of not-yet-complete innovative efforts complicates the inquiry into how the merger will 
affect product-market competition because the central task for merger analysis is to form 
predictions about what competition will look like in the future, with and without the merger.
Where innovation efforts are well underway but have not yet resulted in a tangible product, the 
ongoing innovation may serve as evidence to support treating the merging firms as potential 
competitors: firms that have made substantial investment and progress toward entering a market 
are much more predictable entrants than are firms that could merely undertake such investment.
151 Admittedly, this case is somewhat artificial.  Actual markets are likely to have ongoing waves of innovation.
71
When the merging firms that do not yet compete in a product market, however, definitive 
evidence about cost and demand conditions on which to base predictions of the state of 
competition tends to be lacking.  Even where firms are already product-market competitors, 
ongoing R&D efforts may change the future competitive positions of one or more suppliers. 
Case 2: Innovation-based race to market dominance.  We next consider situations in 
which the innovation efforts of the merging parties and their rivals are the focus of the merger 
analysis, and product-market competition is largely unaffected by the merger.  One type of 
situation fitting this description is winner-take-all competition, where the firms undertake 
competing R&D efforts and the winner of this R&D competition achieves market dominance 
because of a patent, the realization of network effects, or some other phenomenon, such as the 
award of major military procurement contract on a sole-source basis.  If the innovation process 
literally is winner-take-all, then the question of how the merger affects product-market 
competition, which lies at the heart of conventional merger analysis, simply does not arise: the 
post-innovation product market will be monopolized whether or not the proposed merger occurs.  
The public policy concern here is whether the merger will diminish R&D competition and/or 
investment and, thereby, either retard the introduction of new products or result in products that 
offer consumers smaller net benefits.
Another type of situation in which innovation competition is the sole focus is one in 
which the firms proposing to merge produce similar products in several distinct geographical 
markets and are actual or potential competitors in only a proper subset of those markets.
Specifically, suppose that only one of the two firms is present in a U.S. market.  Then there 
would be no conventional concerns regarding a loss of price competition.  But the reduced 
competition in other geographic markets could slow innovation and, thus, adversely affect U.S. 
consumers.
Case 3: Commercially rational delay in competitive innovation.   Our final case 
illustrates the fact that there can be a tension, and hence the need to make a trade-off, between 
static and dynamic policy objectives.  When successful innovation cannot be protected from 
replication or imitation by competitors, perhaps because of weak intellectual property rights, a 
firm may not race for the lead but instead wait for another firm to do the hard work that the 
waiting firm can then copy.  If all firms reason this way, then no firm will want to take the lead 
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and subsidize its competitor’s R&D, and the result will be a waiting game.  Innovation will be 
delayed, possibly forever.  In this case, antitrust agencies may face a choice between (1) allowing 
the waiting firms to merge and internalize the free-riding problem, which would then hasten 
innovation but end product-market competition, and (2) blocking the merger, which would 
preserve product-market competition for existing products but might significantly or permanently 
delay the development and introduction of new products.  In other words, the choice is whether 
to promote long-run innovation or protect short-run price competition.  Similar effects and issues 
arise when a merger would increase innovation by bringing together complementary assets but 
would harm short-run price competition.
Actual enforcement choices may not be as polarized as in this hypothetical.  In particular, 
alternative institutions, such as research joint ventures may allow firms to cooperate in the 
conduct of R&D while remaining product-market competitors. Hence, the evaluation of these 
alternative institutions may be an important component of merger analysis in certain situations 
where innovation is an important dimension of market performance.
Each of the three canonical situations implies a distinct kind of merger inquiry from the 
traditional case focused on static price effects. The sections below survey actual cases that to 
varying degrees reflect the three canonical situations and their associated concerns about the 
relationship between mergers and technological innovation.
B. Starting to Take Innovation Seriously
One of the first merger enforcement actions expressly motivated by innovation concerns was the 
FTC’s 1990 challenge of Roche Holding’s acquisition of Genentech on the grounds that
consolidation of ongoing R&D efforts would affect the future product market and slow the pace 
of innovation.152 The FTC’s complaint asserted that Roche and Genentech competed in R&D for 
important therapies for the treatment of AIDS and HIV infection. Genentech was considered to 
be the leader in developing such treatments, and Roche was actively involved in a competing 
development effort.153
152 Roche Holdings, Ltd., FTC No. C3315 (filed November 18, 1990).
153 See Gilbert and Sunshine (1995, p. 580) for further discussion of this case.
73
The FTC framed the issue with respect to AIDS/HIV therapies purely as one of 
innovation.  The FTC’s focus was on the race to develop products, not on competition in the 
market for existing products.  Others also frame the Roche/Genentech case as one about 
preserving innovation incentives in the market for the drug therapies actually under 
development.154
In terms of the three canonical situations we discussed above, the Roche/Genentech case 
appears to fit Case 1, in which innovation is a concern principally because of substantial existing 
R&D efforts that were very likely to give rise to actual or potential competition in an identifiable 
product market.155 First, with respect to treatments for human growth hormone deficiency, 
Roche appeared to have reached a point where its entry into the market was no longer speculative 
and the question was more a conventional one of price competition than of innovation. Second, 
although the potential product-market competition between Roche and Genentech in the 
AIDS/HIV therapy market was more speculative because both firms were still in the R&D phase, 
the competing R&D efforts were well underway, and the FTC found strong evidence to support 
its predictions that: (a) the relevant product market would develop, and (b) Roche and Genentech 
were the most promising of a small group of companies racing to develop certain AIDS/HIV
treatments.  Thus, even for AIDS/HIV therapies, the FTC did not have to rely on a prediction that 
the acquisition would have reduced the rival innovation efforts.
The Justice Department first challenged a merger on innovation grounds in 1993, when it 
investigated ZF Friedrichshafen’s (ZF) proposed—and later abandoned—acquisition of General 
Motors’ Allison division.156 Allison and ZF produced 85 percent of the world output of heavy-
duty automatic transmissions for trucks and buses. The companies competed against each other 
in the European market for such transmissions but not in the North American market, in which 
GM was dominant.157  The Justice Department nonetheless concluded that even consumers in 
markets whose concentration would be unaffected by the merger would be harmed by the 
154 See, e.g., Gilbert and Sunshine (1995).
155 Some of the concerns raised by the transaction were traditional ones of product-market competition.  For 
example, Roche was on the verge of becoming the major challenger to Genentech’s dominant position in 
the market for human growth hormone deficiency treatments.
156 United States v. General Motors Corp., No. 93-530 (D. Del., filed November 16, 1993).
157 Ibid.
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transaction’s reduction in Allison and ZF’s incentives to develop new designs and products.158
This case was the first expressly to discuss possible R&D-related harms to consumers in 
geographic markets in which the merger would not directly affect price or output levels, and thus 
is an example of the scenario described in Case 2, above.
The ZF/Allison case can be seen as a precursor to the kind of analysis Gilbert and 
Sunshine later advocated in their proposed innovation markets approach.  In some respects, 
however, the case is weak precedent for the recognition of innovation markets in merger policy 
because it does not appear that the outcome turned on innovation concerns.  The merger to an 85 
percent market share of global industry sales of heavy-duty transmissions with a number of other 
overlapping product and geographic markets (including non-transmission products in the United 
States) probably raised enough conventional concerns about static allocative efficiency to justify 
blocking the merger. To be sure, in the ZF/Allison case the traditional efficiency concerns were 
less salient because in some important geographic markets the companies did not compete with 
each other in the sale of relevant products.  In those markets the case against the merger was 
bolstered by the argument for preserving innovation incentives even absent concerns for product-
market competition.  
Even though there is no evidence that innovation considerations were decisive in the light 
of more conventional factors, in one important respect the ZF/Allison case was more aggressive 
in its emphasis on innovation than the Gilbert and Sunshine approach later counseled.  Gilbert 
and Sunshine recommended using innovation markets only where specific R&D efforts that 
might be affected by the merger could be identified, as in the Roche/Genentech case. However, 
the Department of Justice’s focus was not on preserving innovation tied to any particular product 
or identifiable line of research but instead on preserving conditions likely to be more conducive 
to any innovation in the sector generally.  The Department’s action suggests that, if a merger 
would leave an industry with near-monopoly concentration and without other likely sources of 
new developments, then harm to potential innovation could justify a challenge to the transaction.
The ZF/Allison action is thus novel because it preserves separate entities not only for 
reasons of price competition (in some geographic markets) but also for reasons of future 
158 Ibid.
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innovation (in all geographic markets) on the grounds that it is better to have two potential 
innovators rather than one to preserve the possibility for future competition in the sale of new 
technology or for future product-market competition. In the context of a merger to near-
monopoly, the idea doesn’t seem so radical; the merger to near monopoly certainly reduced the 
potential for competition between the two major firms.  But in principle this reasoning represents 
an important change in traditional merger analysis.   It remains to be seen how deep this change 
runs.  The case gives little insight into how the agencies would evaluate a transaction in which 
the post-merger market share was less dominant or in which only innovation, and not product-
market competition, was at stake.
C. Transitional Cases: Innovation Moves to the Fore
The two factors central to the Roche/Genentech and ZF/Allison cases—high levels of 
concentration and competing innovation efforts—have also formed the basis for several more 
recent enforcement actions through which the relationship between merger policy and innovation 
has further developed.
Aerospace Mergers.  The aerospace industry is one of the most innovative economic sectors in 
the United States.  The market is characterized by high concentration levels but also (outside of 
the defense sector) by international competition.  In the late 1990s, the FTC and the Department 
of Justice approved one major aerospace merger and blocked another, respectively.  Innovation 
considerations were central to these enforcement decisions.
In 1997, the FTC approved the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the two largest 
commercial aircraft manufacturers in the United States.159  In that case, analysis of innovation in 
the aerospace industry supported the merger, not because the transaction was expected to 
increase R&D but because the analysis showed that McDonnell Douglas had fallen behind 
technologically and no longer could exert competitive pressure on its rivals.160  Acquisition by 
159 See Pitofsky, Robert, et al. (1997) Statement In the Matter of the Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation, FTC file no. 971-0051, July 1, 1997.
160 Ibid at 2.
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Boeing would therefore not reduce future competition and would allow McDonnell Douglas’s 
assets to be put to better use by a more technologically advanced enterprise.
Concerns about technological progress in aerospace led to a different conclusion with 
respect to Lockheed Martin’s proposed acquisition of Northrop Grumman.  The Justice 
Department’s challenge to the merger explained that Lockheed and Northrop were two of the 
leading suppliers of aircraft and electronics systems to the U.S. military.161  The Justice 
Department concluded that the merger would give Lockheed a monopoly in systems for airborne 
early-warning radar, electro-optical missile warning, fiber-optic towed decoys, and infrared 
countermeasure systems.162  In addition, the merger would reduce the number of competitors 
from three to two in: high-performance, fixed-wing military airplanes; on-board radio 
countermeasures; and stealth technology.163 The Justice Department contended that consolidation 
in these markets would lead to higher prices, higher costs, and reduced innovation for products 
and systems required by the U.S. military.164
Although traditional concerns about adverse effects on price competition were an 
important part of the Justice Department’s challenge to Lockheed’s acquisition of Northrop, 
innovation concerns were central.  For example, the Department noted that Lockheed and 
Northrop had both started R&D programs for advanced airborne early-warning radar systems,
and the Department concluded that consolidation of the two R&D efforts would harm future 
military procurement.165  The Justice Department also found evidence that competition is 
particularly important for technological advances in high-performance military aircraft and that 
important innovations have often been made by firms other than the incumbent suppliers of 
particular systems.  Thus, it concluded that “competition is vital to maximize both the innovative 
ideas associated with each military aircraft program, as well as the quality of the processes used 
161 United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop Grumman Corp., Complaint (D.D.C., filed 3/23/98).
162 Ibid at 2.
163 Ibid at 3.
164 Ibid at 3.
165 Ibid at 7-8.
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to turn innovative ideas into cost-effective, technically sound, and efficiently produced 
aircraft.”166
The Justice Department’s conclusion in the Lockheed/Northrop case that preserving 
competition in the relevant markets would enhance innovation was based principally on two 
factors that weighed against permitting the transaction:  (1) evidence that Lockheed and Northrop 
were either actually conducting competing R&D on important products or were the leading 
contenders to conduct such R&D in the future, and (2) evidence that consolidation would lead to 
either monopoly or substantial dominance in relevant product markets, not just reducing but in 
large part eliminating competitive pressure to innovate.
Thus, to a large extent, Lockheed/Northrop fits the parameters of Case 2; what was at 
stake was the race to develop technology that would win a major government contract. The 
Justice Department found, at least implicitly, that the benefits of faster innovation and a choice of 
alternative technologies offset possible costs of effort duplication in the aerospace/defense sector.  
In addition, it was possible that, if the two technologies that the competitors developed were truly 
substitutes (that is, both companies developed viable products), then the government would also 
get the benefit of conventional product-market competition between bidders for the contract.  In 
other words, mixed with the innovation concern central to the case was also a more conventional, 
static pricing concern.167
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals.  In the mid-1990s, innovation concerns played a central role 
in the FTC’s crafting of a consent agreement Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz that allowed them to merge 
into a new company now known as Novartis.  The FTC had raised several objections to the
merger.168  Along traditional merger policy lines, the FTC was concerned that the combination 
would give the merged entity power to raise prices in the markets for herbicides used in growing 
corn and for flea-control products for pets.169 The more novel parts of the FTC’s challenge, 
166 Ibid at 26.
167 Similar issues arose and conclusions were reached in the Department of Justice’s challenge of a proposed 
merger of the only two companies that manufacture nuclear submarines for the United States.  (United 
States of America v. General Dynamics Corporation and Newport News Shipbuilding, Inc., Verified 
Complaint, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, October 23, 2001.) 
168 See In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy Ltd., et al., Decision and Order, FTC Docket No. C-3725, March 24, 1997.
169 Ibid.
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however, had to do with research and development and the prospects for future innovations in the 
market for gene therapy products—products that allow treatment of diseases and medical 
conditions by modifying genes in patients’ cells.
At the time of the FTC’s investigation in 1996 and 1997, no gene therapy products were 
on the market or even approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).170  Conventional 
merger analysis therefore did not apply because no product market existed in which to analyze 
the merger’s effects on prices and output.  The FTC instead adopted a dynamic perspective and, 
looking to the future, it found long-run competitive concerns.  The sales of gene therapy products 
were expected to grow rapidly, with projections for a $45 billion market by 2010.171  Ciba and 
Sandoz were either among the few or the only firms with the technological capabilities and 
intellectual property rights necessary to develop gene therapy products commercially.  The FTC 
stated in its complaint against the proposed merger that Ciba and Sandoz together would control 
essential patents, know-how, and proprietary commercial rights without which other firms—even 
if capable of developing gene therapy products—would be unable to commercialize them. The 
FTC was concerned that the post-merger company, Novartis, might not adequately license its 
gene therapy intellectual property to ensure that other firms would be able to close the R&D gap.
The FTC concluded that “preserving long-run innovation in these circumstances is critical.”172
The FTC did not, however, block the merger.  Instead, it crafted a consent decree 
designed to correct those aspects of the transaction that raised concerns for current and future 
competition and innovation.  As noted above, the FTC had conventional product-market 
competition concerns with respect to the overlapping herbicide and flea-control businesses.  The 
FTC accordingly ordered one party to divest those businesses.173 More notable, however, was 
the fact that the FTC did not require divestiture of either firm’s gene therapy division.  Instead,
Ciba and Sandoz agreed that they would license technology and patents sufficient for one of its 
170 See FTC, In the Matter of Ciba-Geigy Ltd, et al., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment, at 3.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
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major rivals to compete against the merged entity in the development of gene therapy 
products.174
The FTC’s remedy steered between the potentially conflicting economic effects that a 
merger might have on R&D.  On one hand, coordinating two entities’ innovation efforts and 
possibly consolidating complementary capabilities can enhance innovation and allow the 
combination of entities to achieve what the entities individually could not do as easily.175 On the 
other hand, concentrating markets to near-monopoly levels can dampen the pressure to innovate 
and reduce the enhanced probability of success that comes from multiple R&D efforts.  Both 
concerns are reflected in the FTC’s enforcement action.  The FTC declined to order either Ciba 
or Sandoz to divest its gene therapy subsidiary because it found that R&D efforts between the 
parent companies and their respective subsidiaries were closely coordinated, making divestiture 
disruptive and counterproductive for innovation.  The decision instead to order compulsory 
licensing to a capable competitor was designed to preserve both competition and the benefits of 
the merging parties’ relationships with each other and their respective gene therapy subsidiaries.
The market context in which the FTC’s focus on innovation occurred is significant.  The 
merger did not simply change the degree of competition within a middling range of market 
concentration.  Rather, the combination of Ciba and Sandoz concentrated nearly all innovation 
efforts and essential inputs for commercialization of gene therapy under one corporate roof.  
Innovation concerns were sufficient to motivate enforcement because the facts showed a 
combination of monopoly market structure and reduction in the number of actual (as opposed to 
potential) innovation efforts.  To some degree, this was a traditional potential-entry case with 
respect to product-market competition.  But the action also broke important new ground: it 
expressly recognized that a merger could be challenged on grounds of the effects it would have 
on future innovation and competition in a product market that does not yet—but likely will—
exist.
174 Ibid at 9.
175 There are, however, significant issues concerning whether a merger is necessary, or whether firms could 
instead rely on intellectual property licensing, contract research, or research joint ventures.  See the 
discussion of merger specificity in Section VI above.
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The contrast between the Ciba/Sandoz action and the ZF/Allison action is an interesting 
one. In ZF/Allison, the issue concerned a product market with (as yet) nonexistent innovation; in 
Ciba/Sandoz, the issue was innovation for an (as yet) nonexistent product market. 
D. Recent Case Developments: More Nuanced Analysis?
The antitrust agencies' focus on innovation in merger review, which became evident in the 1990s, 
has continued to develop.  Although most innovation cases involve advanced stages of 
innovation—so that the issue is more one of potential product-market competition than 
innovation for its own sake—the Department of Justice and FTC have both also expressed 
interest in protecting innovation for its own sake, as the following cases illustrate.
The proposed $16 billion merger of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc into the pharmaceutical 
company known as Aventis raised both potential and actual competition concerns for the FTC. 176
Innovation was central to the potential competition aspects of the merger.  Hoechst had an 
existing anticlotting product and Rhône-Poulenc was close behind, with a product almost 
through the FDA review process. As in Ciba/Sandoz, the FTC was also concerned about a 
combination of patent portfolios, in this case, patents related to anticlotting agents.  In December 
1999, the FTC entered into a proposed consent agreement settling its charges that the merger 
would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The parties were allowed to merge on the condition, 
among others, that they divest intellectual-property assets relating to Rhône-Poulenc's direct 
thrombin inhibitor drug Revasc to preserve competition and the opportunity for innovation in 
direct thrombin inhibition as a superior treatment for blood-clotting diseases.177
The FTC again faced a mix of product- and innovation-based potential competition issues 
in its challenge to the Amgen/Immunex merger in 2002.178  At the time Amgen and Immunex 
proposed to merge, Amgen had the only IL-1 inhibitor (which is used to treat rheumatoid 
arthritis) on the U.S. market. Immunex and one other firm, Regeneron, were the only other 
176 Hoechst AG, FTC Docket No. C-3939 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3919.htm.  See, 
also, Arquit, Kevin J., and Richard Wolfram (2001) “Mergers and acquisitions: United states government 
antitrust analysis and enforcement,” PLI Order No. B0-00Z6 May 10-11, 2001 - New York City May 17-
18, 2001 - Chicago May 31-June 1, 2001 - San Francisco 42nd Annual Antitrust Law Institute, at 453.
177 Hoechst AG, FTC Docket No. C-3939 (2000), available at www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3919.htm
178 Amgen Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4056 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c4056.htm.
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companies with IL-1 inhibitors in U.S. clinical trials. The FTC feared that the combination of the 
Amgen and Immunex patent portfolios might allow the merged firm to block entry by Regeneron
by eliminating potential competition in the sale of intellectual property by the merging parties to 
Regeneron or other third parties. The FTC expressed concern not only that the merger would 
harm potential product-market competition but also that the combination would reduce R&D 
competition for related new products.179 The FTC nonetheless allowed the merger to proceed 
based on a consent decree that required the licensing of certain patents to Regeneron. The FTC 
reached a similar result in its review of the Glaxo/SmithKline Beecham merger in 2001.180
The cases discussed so far may leave the impression that innovation has been salient only 
in megamergers where billions of dollars are at stake in the transaction and/or in particular 
industry sectors, notably pharmaceuticals and defense aerospace. But that is not the case.  As 
noted in our earlier discussion of remedies in Section VII, the Department of Justice sued in 2001 
to block 3D’s proposed $45 million acquisition of DTM, alleging that the transaction as
originally structured would have resulted in higher prices and less innovation for industrial RP 
systems in the United States.181 The complaint alleged that “3D and DTM offered the most 
sophisticated systems in the industry and competed directly against each other in the 
development, manufacture, and sale of industrial rapid prototyping systems and materials.”182
The acquisition would have combined the two largest manufacturers of RP systems in the United 
States; reduced the number of competitors in the U.S. market for industrial RP systems from 
three to two; and resulted in the combined company having a U.S. market share, by revenue, of 
80 percent.183  The Department of Justice settled the case through a consent decree that required
3D and DTM to license their RP-related patents to a firm that would compete against the merged 
enterprise in the U.S. market. The district court’s decision entering the decree expressly 
179 Complaint, Amgen Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4056 (2002), at 5-6. available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c4056.htm.
180 http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/glaxosmithklinecmp.pdf.
181 United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp., C.V. No. 1:01CV01237 (D.D.C. filed June 6, 2001), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f8800/8896.htm (Complaint).  See, also, United States v. 3D 
Systems, 2002-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,738 (D.D.C. 2002) (Final judgment).
182 United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp., Complaint, Section 21.
183 Ibid.
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discussed the merger's potential impact on innovation as well as price competition in the market 
for rapid prototyping systems, although the licensing remedy seems more directly aimed at 
potential product-market competition than at innovation.184
Taken together, the merger cases in which the U.S. antitrust agencies have made 
innovation a central issue fall mostly into the first of the abstract cases we set out at the 
beginning of this Section: they have involved innovation efforts sufficiently well underway that 
one of the merging parties can convincingly be considered a potential competitor of the other.  
Review of those mergers has thus fit relatively comfortably into the existing framework for 
merger policy. But at least some cases have paid lip service, or even purported to base 
enforcement, on the preservation of innovation for its own sake in a particular industrial sector.  
In these cases—for example, ZF/Allison and 3D/DTM—the agencies did not undertake a 
detailed analysis of the market structures in the relevant industries that would be most conducive 
to innovation, nor did they examine the welfare consequences of reduced innovation in the 
industries at issue.  In the ZF/Allison case, the Department of Justice appears implicitly to have 
assumed that one larger firm would be worse for innovation than two already quite large 
enterprises would be.  In the 3D/DTM case, the consolidation from three to two major U.S. firms 
raised concerns about innovation, although those concerns were deemed to have been allayed by 
the consent decree.
In a recent case that exemplifies our abstract Case 2, the Federal Trade Commission took 
a significant step toward erasing the key presumption—that very high levels of concentration 
would likely be bad for innovation—that appears to have informed the ZF/Allison case. In 2004, 
the FTC decided by divided vote to allow the merger of Gemzyme Corp. and Novazyme Corp., 
the only two companies developing therapies for a rare disorder known as Pompe disease. 
Genzyme was unusual in that the government approved a merger to monopoly. But the case was 
even more exceptional because the FTC appears to have based its decision solely on analysis of 
the transaction’s effects on innovation (the very considerations that blocked a merger to 
monopoly in ZF/Allison) rather than its effects on price and output. After many mergers in 
which the agencies addressed innovation in an ad hoc manner and without expressly stating the 
184 United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp., Final judgment, at 11.
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presumptions they were applying in the innovation context, Genzyme was the first case in which 
authorities expressly found the flow of new technology to be determinative and tried to establish 
principles for when and how antitrust enforcers should analyze innovation effects when 
reviewing mergers.  
The FTC’s 3-1 vote to allow the Genzyme/Novazyme merger is accompanied by three 
written statements, one by Chairman Muris in support of the majority’s position, one by 
Commissioner Thompson in dissent, and one by Commissioner Harbour.  Commissioner 
Harbour’s statement is unusual in that she did not participate in the vote, having been confirmed 
to the Commission after argument occurred, but nonetheless wrote a statement expressing her 
views and supporting Commissioner Thompson’s dissent.
Chairman Muris’ statement, which has the legal status of persuasive rather than binding 
authority, advocates several principles for merger cases in which innovation is a central issue.185
Implicit in the Chairman’s statement is that the FTC can base a merger enforcement decision 
solely on innovation effects. This in itself is an important step. Muris argues that two principles 
should guide any such analysis of innovation effects. First, he states that enforcement agencies 
should take innovation into account only when the relevant innovators are few in number and 
readily identifiable. Second, and critically, Muris writes that the FTC should neither adopt any 
presumption about the relationship between market structure and innovation nor, therefore, 
presume that increased consolidation will harm innovation. The agency should instead consider 
innovation on a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry. Muris finds inquiry into the facts of 
Genzyme to show that innovation would not suffer and could benefit from the merger.
The dissenting statements take greatest issue with the latter points. Commissioners 
Thompson and Harbour argue that the Commission should presume that increased concentration 
will harm innovation just as the antitrust agencies presume increased concentration will harm 
product-market competition and raise prices. Commissioner Thompson moreover argues that 
185 No other members of the majority signed Chairman Muris’ statement. As such, under Commission practice 
the decision is not binding, although as the sole written statement for the majority it is due some deference 
as persuasive authority. [CITE]. 
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regardless of the presumption, the majority’s factual analysis was incorrect and the merger 
should be challenged as likely to harm research and development of Pompe disease therapies.
Genzyme serves as an interesting marker for the current state of debate of antitrust and 
innovation in the agencies. The FTC, at least, has now clearly accepted that innovation is an 
objective that antitrust agencies can pursue in merger review even where product-market 
competition is not at issue.  Moreover, the majority, at least, treated the innovation analysis quite 
differently from a standard analysis of product market prices and output levels. It clearly rejected 
the conventional concentration-competition-welfare presumption and opted instead for a direct 
analysis of the case-specific facts, similarly jettisoning market definition on the grounds that, on 
the facts of this case, the direct effects were able to be analyzed without the formalities of 
conventional “hypothetical monopolist” kinds of tests. But the contrary position of two 
Commissioners that conventional product-market presumptions should apply in the innovation 
context indicates how alive the debate remains.
How salient a precedent Genzyme will be remains to be seen. Time will tell whether the 
case marks a turning point in antitrust law after which innovation will be the central focus of 
many agency and court decisions, and whether it sets out principles for innovation analysis that 
will endure. We will return to Genzyme in our conclusion and argue that the case is a mixed bag 
under our recommendations; it does some things right but other things we think would constitute 
unfortunate precedent. The case does make one thing clear: innovation is becoming an 
increasingly central issue in merger analysis at the antitrust agencies and, importantly, has now 
become an issue that itself can determine the outcome of enforcement decisions.
IX. Conclusion: Implementing Dynamic Merger Policy
We conclude by summarizing our policy recommendations and discussing the application of 
these recommendations to Genzyme as an example of how they might apply in real cases.
A. Policy Recommendations
Although there is much that we are still learning about market dynamics and the innovation 
process, antitrust enforcers have tools available for taking innovation into account in merger 
analysis.  The cases in which the Department of Justice and the FTC have already addressed 
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innovation demonstrate that the agencies are sensitive to the ways that innovation can affect 
future competition in product markets.  The use of information about innovation to support 
objections to a merger based on potential competition concerns does not require fundamental 
change to the existing merger-policy framework. The harder issues for merger policy include 
four kinds of problems that transactions involving innovation raise: (1) the need to assess 
potential product-market competition from innovation efforts still far from completion; (2) the 
question of whether current product sales and production capabilities are relevant to the 
assessment of future competition; (3) a merger’s effect on innovation; and (4) possible trade-offs 
between dynamic-innovation benefits and static-competition benefits. 
The first issue is an evidentiary one.  At what point is evidence of innovation sufficient 
for the agencies or courts to determine that the innovator is a predictable product-market 
competitor?  Most of the cases to date have involved innovations that were essentially complete 
and undergoing trials and/or regulatory approval.  But some transactions will warrant a more 
dynamic view of potential competition.  The challenge for the agencies and courts in such cases 
will not require change to the existing merger-review framework so much as it will involve 
articulating parameters of the factual inquiry from which the agencies and courts will infer 
potential competition from evidence of ongoing innovation.
The second issue, whether current market shares are relevant to predicting future product-
market competition, can be addressed within the standard conceptual framework codified by the 
Merger Guidelines, and well-developed economic tools are available for addressing the question.  
However, a movement away from a predominant focus on market shares and toward a more 
refined analysis of industry conditions and the nature of competition would represent a change in 
the practice of merger litigation by reducing the primacy of market definition in merger cases.
We do not advocate dispensing with the Merger Guidelines or eliminating market definition 
from merger review. Properly applied, these tools are useful and, moreover, they provide some
predictive guidance for businesses.  Our point is that insistence on rigid, bright-line market 
boundaries will fail to capture the realities of dynamic industries in which innovation shifts and 
blurs those boundaries over time. A broader approach that takes into account more evidence 
about how competition is evolving in an industry might give a better picture of a merger’s likely 
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effects and avoid the errors that could result from the rigid in-or-out view of the hypothetical
monopolist approach to market definition that dominates conventional merger review.
The two remaining problems listed above are more difficult and fundamental for the 
existing framework, on both conceptual and practical levels.  The questions of the efficient 
amount or timing of innovation, and of the comparative values of product-market competition 
today versus improved products tomorrow, do not fit easily into the conventional merger review 
framework.  Antitrust agencies could decide not to address these issues and could retain their 
focus instead on more conventional product-market concerns.  Or, as the “Schumpeterian” school 
advocates, the agencies could refrain from quantifying innovation effects and simply reduce 
enforcement, even when it is warranted according to conventional criteria, in the name of not 
impeding innovation. But the impact of innovation on economic welfare and the impact of 
market structure on innovation will occur whether or not antitrust policy accounts for them, and 
there is no evidence that ignoring innovation in the conventional framework or retreating from 
conventional enforcement will benefit either long-run or short-run consumer welfare.  Hence, if 
the agencies choose either of these courses of action (or inaction), judgments about the impacts 
for and from innovation would be made implicitly and without reflection.  To the extent policy 
makers wish to avoid the potential costs of ignoring innovation, the question becomes how 
antitrust agencies should proceed to incorporate innovation concerns into their mission. This 
article draws broad lessons and makes specific recommendations for accomplishing that task. 
The overarching lessons from our analysis are two.  First, recommendations for a general 
reduction from antitrust enforcement in the name of innovation are neither well-grounded in 
economic theory nor supported by economic evidence, so antitrust agencies should neither 
systematically retreat from merger enforcement nor shy away from taking innovation more 
affirmatively into account in the course of merger review.  Second, merger-policy enforcers 
should recognize that innovation will depend more heavily on factual inquiries specific to a given 
case and less on systematic presumptions of the kind merger policy has long applied to static, 
product-market competition.
Our analysis also suggests several, more specific, recommendations that the agencies 
charged with developing and enforcing merger policy can implement to address innovation and 
its potential effects in the merger-review process.
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First, the antitrust agencies should develop and articulate guidelines for drawing 
inferences of potential product-market competition from evidence of ongoing innovation.  Doing 
so would extend the existing framework to cover several situations in which innovation plays an 
important role in competition and economic welfare and, we argue, should therefore play an 
important role in merger analysis. 
Second, agencies should continue to expand their consideration of mergers’ effects on 
innovation and consumer welfare to cases in which the concern is with innovation itself, 
including potential R&D projects that are not already underway but that would increase 
economic welfare. Sometimes the static price effects and innovation effects of a merger will go 
in the same directions, but at other times the merger might be bad for the former and good for the 
latter. The need to make trade-offs between innovation and short-term product-market 
competition may therefore arise.  The agencies should provide guidance on how they would 
make these trade-offs.  
So far, the agencies have been cautious in moving beyond concerns about potential,
product-market competition based on well-defined innovative efforts.  The agencies also have 
not made explicit trade-offs between innovation and short- term product-market competition.  The 
agencies should, however, consider broadening their inquiry to take these important effects into 
account. As we have discussed, this is a difficult task in the existing merger enforcement 
framework because the concentration-competition-welfare presumption that informs the Merger 
Guidelines, which holds that a significant increase in concentration is likely to harm product-
market competition and consumers, does not carry over to innovation.  We find the evidence to 
support instead a limited presumption that a reduction in the number of competing innovators 
reduces innovation in the absence of any efficiency effects.  We emphasize, however, that this 
presumption should be fairly weak except in the case of merger to monopoly, and even there it 
would be rebuttable.  Instead of presumptions, detailed case-by-case analysis will be needed. For 
that reason, except in cases of merger to monopoly, enforcement aimed at preserving innovation 
must proceed mostly without the benefit of the presumption that concentration will be harmful. 
Therefore, a third approach that the agencies might pursue would be to develop the 
expertise that would allow case-by-case, fact-intensive inquiries to assess the welfare effects and 
trade-offs posed by mergers where innovation is at stake.  Academic researchers can make an 
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important contribution to this effort by conducting industry-specific studies that provide a deeper 
understanding of the history and conditions for innovation in different economic sectors regularly 
at issue in mergers.  As observed in Section III, empirical research demonstrates that industry-
specific factors play important roles in mediating the relationship between concentration and firm 
size on the one hand and the pace of innovation on the other.  Additional studies of the sort we 
recommend might lead to the identification of fact patterns that allow clearer understanding of 
how to treat innovation in the context of different kinds of transactions that come up for review.
Fourth, antitrust policy makers should rethink both the emphasis on market definition and 
the insistence on bright-line bright line market boundaries in merger cases, particularly in 
dynamic markets. There are well- known pitfalls in the determination of relevant markets and the 
use of market share to predict competitive effects.  We show that the dangers of these pitfalls are 
made worse by the presence of significant innovation.  The agencies and, particularly, the courts 
should be especially careful in an innovation case not to let the mechanics of market definition 
and market share calculations stand in the way of conducting sound economic analysis of the 
merger’s likely effects. We find that emphasis instead on direct evidence of probable effects of 
the merger will likely produce better results in mergers involving innovation, even though that 
inquiry may at times be very difficult. 
Our fifth recommendation relates to that difficulty and is that the agencies use the tools of 
decision theory to deal with uncertainty, particularly with respect to innovation.  Under current 
practice, for example, the agencies often take an approach of considering a two-year horizon in 
assessing the effects of entry, with little or no discounting within the horizon and complete 
discounting of anything beyond.186  Similarly, efficiency benefits that are realized only with a lag 
are “given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”187 Standard 
decision theory indicates, however, that these approaches are poor heuristics for calculating 
expected payoffs in the face of uncertainty.  For example, these approaches to entry tend to 
underestimate the effects of potentially revolutionary innovations that have some probability of 
having large effects over a period of several years.  The conventional decision-theoretic approach 
186 Merger Guidelines, Section 3.2.  The agencies sometimes take a more sophisticated view, at least when 
deciding whether to file a case against a proposed merger, if not in court.
187 Ibid, footnote 37.
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would be to estimate probability distributions for alternative potential outcomes and then use 
those probabilities as weights in projecting an expected net present value of a merger’s effects on 
consumer welfare.188  More broadly, the effects of mergers on innovation are uncertain and occur 
over time, and the agencies and the courts have not made full use of established decision theory 
to structure their analyses of consumer-welfare effects.
B. How Our Polices Might Work in Practice and Make a Difference
Our analysis finds that an antitrust agency reviewing a merger in which innovation is important 
should take several steps. First, the agencies should examine whether innovation is underway 
that is likely to affect competition in a relevant product market and to account for the likely 
effects.  For example, if one of the merging parties is engaged in innovation that would make it a 
likely new, or better existing, competitor to the other merging party, then the transaction would 
appear to reduce likely product-market competition. If, on the other hand, two competitors are 
merging but a third party has undertaken innovation that makes it a likely new entrant into the 
relevant market, then that innovation may make the future impact of the merger less harmful than 
it would seem absent incorporation of the third party’s innovation efforts into the merger review.
In this first step, innovation is a factor in the analysis of future product-market competition. The 
conventional concentration-competition-welfare presumption applies here and, if the transaction 
will decrease potential competition it will be deemed presumptively harmful.
Second, antitrust agencies should ask whether a merger is likely to have effects on 
innovation itself. Will the merger create beneficial coordination in R&D, prevent wasteful R&D, 
and/or raise incentives to undertake innovation that are not likely to occur absent the merger?
Or, will the merger create disincentives to invest in current or future R&D efforts? In this second 
step, a fact-intensive inquiry will be needed and, except in the case of merger to monopoly, we 
advocate that no presumption of harm to innovation follow from a finding that the merger will 
reduce the number of firms competing to undertake a particular line of R&D.   In this step we 
thus counsel against the agencies’ reliance on the conventional Merger Guidelines approach 
when it comes to innovation, but also counsel against the anti-enforcement presumption of the 
188 We observe in passing that there are difficult legal issues concerning whether the courts can appropriately 
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Schumpeterian approach. The differences in the presumptions applicable to conventional 
product market analysis and innovation analysis in merger review are summarized in the table 
below.
Table: Comparative Burdens and Presumptions in 
Conventional vs. Innovation-Based Merger Review
Static Price and
Output Effects Innovation Effects
Change in 
Competition
Plaintiff’s burden to show harm 
with a rebuttable presumption of 
harm based on concentration.
(Plaintiff wins on presumption if 
it proves concentration in 
relevant market and all other 
evidence of harms and benefits is 
equal.)
Plaintiff’s burden to show 
harm, defendant’s burden to 
show gain, with very limited 
presumption of harm. (Except 
in cases of merger to 
monopoly, defendant wins if 
evidence of harms and 
benefits is equal.)
Efficiencies Defendant’s burden Defendant’s burden
Third, once an agency determines the effects of the merger on product-market 
competition and on innovation, the agency decides whether approving (perhaps with conditions) 
or blocking the merger will have the higher net benefit for consumer welfare. In some cases a 
merger’s effects on product-market competition and innovation will run in the same direction 
and the welfare enhancing course of action will thus be clear. In other cases, there may be trade-
offs between static and dynamic benefits, and the case for enforcement or clearance will be more 
ambiguous. In ambiguous cases, we recommend the agency adopt a careful analysis of the 
comparative probabilities and values of the various costs and benefits from the merger, rather 
than relying on overly simple heuristics, such as simply asking whether harm is likely.
We illustrate these steps and how they differ from current practice by examining a recent 
case in which innovation concerns featured prominently in agency decision making. Because we 
aggregate welfare affects across different generations of consumers.
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do not have access to the complete files considered by the agencies and courts, we reserve 
judgment on whether following our recommendations would have changed the ultimate 
conclusion.
The case, the Genzyme/Novazyme merger, is interesting because some—but not all—of 
the steps in the FTC’s review are consistent with our recommendations. The case therefore 
provides, in a single example, an opportunity to see how some of our recommendations might 
work in practice and also to show how other of our proposals might have led to a different 
analysis. In Genzyme, which we discussed in Section VIII above, there were three separate 
statements from FTC Commissioners, one from then-Chair Timothy Muris in support of the 
majority’s decision to approve the merger and two, from Commissioners Thompson and 
Harbour, in dissent. We focus primarily on Muris’s statement and his analysis of the merger. 
As a preliminary matter, Muris analyzed the merger solely in terms of its impact 
innovation and not in terms of its effects on product-market competition. The first step of his
analysis of innovation effects was to eliminate any broad presumption about the effects of a 
merger on parties’ incentives or ability to invest in innovation. The second step was, in the 
absence of a general presumption about the relationship between market structure and 
innovation, to undertake a fact-intensive inquiry into how R&D related to Pompe disease 
treatments has worked and is likely to work in the future, taking into account both facts specific 
to the merging parties and facts related to the pharmaceuticals industry as a whole.  The third step 
was to consider both theories of harm and theories of benefits from the merger in the light of the 
case-specific facts. Finally, Muris’s fourth step was to attach probabilities to the potential harms 
and benefits and to calculate the expected, net effect of the merger. 
Muris does several things in the four steps listed above that fit well with our framework. 
To begin with, we agree with his threshold finding that a merger’s effects on innovation are a 
valid, central issue for antitrust enforcement.  And our proposals are broadly consistent with 
Muris’s abandonment of the standard concentration-competition-welfare presumption and his 
corresponding emphasis on case-specific, factual inquiry of likely effects on innovation is the 
correct approach. Similarly, Muris’s assessment of the comparative probabilities of harms and 
benefits leads him toward the decision-theoretic approach we advocate for addressing the 
uncertain outcomes of mergers in dynamic markets. 
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Our framework would, however, approach each of the steps above somewhat differently 
from the way Muris does in his statement. First, although we counsel weakening the 
presumption of harm from concentration in the context of innovation effects, we do not abandon 
it to the extent Muris does. In particular, we preserve a presumption of harm in the case of 
merger to monopoly, whereas in Genzyme, Muris abandons any presumption of harm even in a 
merger to monopoly. Our factual determination and assessment of harms would therefore 
proceed against that backdrop and with a burden on the merged parties to show a lack of harm. 
Second, our use of decision theory would work differently. Muris sets out two possible 
states of the world: one in which Genzyme’s internal R&D effort fails, and one in which that 
internal R&D effort succeeds. He attaches a probability of 25 percent to the first outcome and a 
probability of 75 percent to the second. If the first state of the world results, Muris argues the 
merger benefits will be very high because the transaction provides the incentive and ability for 
the merged entity to accelerate the development of Novazyme’s alternative. In the second state 
of the world, there is some possibility of harm because with its own successful Pompe therapy, 
Novazyme might retard further development of Novazyme’s alternative therapy. Muris argues 
the likelihood of such conduct is slim, however. His cost- benefit calculation therefore looks like 
(.25) x (large benefit) – (.75) x (small harm), leading Muris to conclude there is a net benefit to 
be expected from the merger.
We have two concerns about this calculation, even while applauding the general 
approach. Our first concern is that there is no inquiry in the Chairman’s analysis whether the 
large benefit in the first state of the world is merger-specific. To the extent that a joint venture 
with either Genzyme of a different R&D partner could accelerate Novazyme’s R&D, that benefit 
should be discounted in the cost/benefit assessment of the merger. Our second concern is that 
the low value Muris assigns to the harms in the second state of the world is not well justified by 
his analysis. Muris finds a high probability, 75 percent, that Genzyme’s internal R&D effort will 
succeed. He then finds that if Genzyme succeeds there is a small chance that Genzyme will pull 
back efforts on Novazyme’s product. From that small chance, Muris infers a small harm. But 
Muris nowhere discusses what the magnitude of that harm would be if the small chance came to 
pass. He says only that the conditional likelihood of the harm—reduced development of 
Novazyme’s alternative therapy—is low and, multiplying the high probability of the second state 
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of the world by that small likelihood, concludes that the expected magnitude of harm in that state 
is low. But the calculation misses an important ingredient, which is the fact that the harm from 
slowing innovation in an alternative therapy could be very high, even if the likelihood is low. So, 
Muris’s harms calculation needs an additional, intermediate step: multiplication of the low 
likelihood of harm in the second state of the world by the magnitude of that harm. It is the 
product of that calculation that should, under a correct decision-theoretic approach, in turn be 
multiplied by the .75 probability of the second state of the world.  In principle, the net result of 
the corrected welfare calculation could be quite different from Muris’s result. 
Our final concern with Muris’ analysis involves a step he did not take. He nowhere 
analyzes the product-market effects of the merger, although from the facts it is far from clear that 
there are no such effects.  Although his statement does not offer an explanation for the gap, it is 
possible that the winner-take-all nature of the race to develop a Pompe therapy made the product 
market appear to be unaffected. But a longer-run view of product-market competition might 
reveal that the merger could have very real effects on potential competition to develop second-
generation Pompe therapies by leaving only one rather than two firms in the market to engage in 
follow-on R&D. As we discussed in Section III, it is particularly for second-generation 
innovation that monopoly brings comparative disadvantages to competition. Absent inclusion of 
potential product-market effects, the ultimate welfare calculation for the majority’s approval of 
the Genzyme/Novazyme transaction appears incomplete.
Although we are critical of some aspects of Chairman Muris’ analysis, we support his 
general approach and believe the decision to be significant. We do not support the view of the 
dissenting statements that the conventional merger enforcement framework and presumptions 
should apply without engaging the different and complex ways that innovation might interact 
with the goals and presumptions of that framework. 
The Genzyme case leaves us hopeful. It represents a continued willingness of the antitrust 
agencies to adapt merger review to the task of better accounting for and preserving innovation. 
Our goal has been to strengthen the argument in favor of undertaking that task and to offer 
improved tools with which to complete it.
